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CONFERRING DIGNITY: THE METAMORPHOSIS OF
THE LEGAL HOMOSEXUAL
NOA BEN-ASHER*
The legal homosexual has undergone a dramatic transforma-
tion over the past three decades, culminating in United States v.
Windsor, which struck down Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA). In 1986, the homosexual was a sexual outlaw be-
yond the protection of the Constitution. By 2013, the homosexual
had become part of a married couple that is “deemed by the State
worthy of dignity.” This Article tells the story of this metamor-
phosis in four phases. In the first, the “Homosexual Sodomite
Phase,” the United States Supreme Court famously declared in
Bowers v. Hardwick that there was no right to engage in homosex-
ual sodomy. In the second, the “Equal Homosexual Class Phase,”
the Court in Romer v. Evans cast the legal homosexual as a mem-
ber of a “class of citizens” whose exclusion from anti-discrimina-
tion protections the Constitution could not tolerate. In the third, the
“Free Intimate Bond Phase,” the Court shifted its focus in Law-
rence v. Texas to an enduring intimate bond involving private sex-
ual acts protected from government intrusion. In the fourth and
current phase, the “Dignified Married Couple Phase,” the Court in
United States v. Windsor validated the decision of several states to
“confer” upon homosexuals “a dignity and status of immense
import.”
The heart of the Article is an analysis of this final phase. Al-
though Windsor is an important civil rights victory, the Court’s
opinion ushers in important consequences for the legal homosex-
ual. In the process of dignifying the same-sex couple, the Court
erased the terms “homosexual” and “lesbian,” cast marriage as an
elevated moral state, and, most importantly, promoted a concept
that the Article calls a “weak dignity.” Windsor’s dignity is weak
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in three ways. First, human dignity was not understood by the
Court as inherent in all humans. The Court instead assumed that
the State confers dignity upon individuals. Second, Windsor’s con-
cept of dignity is much narrower than theories promoted by con-
temporary moral and legal philosophers. Third, Windsor adopted a
rhetoric of injury and pity that presents all those in same-sex rela-
tionships and their children as the wounded and humiliated victims
of DOMA. The Article concludes with suggestions on how advo-
cates and courts applying Windsor can employ the concept of
equal dignity while moving beyond Windsor’s weaknesses.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s historic decision in United States v. Windsor1 is
striking for, among other things, the conspicuous absence of the words “ho-
mosexual,” “lesbian,” or “bisexual.” In place of these characters, Windsor
introduces us to the new legal homosexual2: the “same-sex couple.”3 In June
of 2013, in this much-celebrated decision, the Court invalidated Section 3 of
the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which defined marriage, for federal
purposes, as “only a legal union between one man and one woman.”4 The
Court held that this definition violates the Fifth Amendment and interferes
“with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages.”5
Windsor completed a three-decade transformation of the legal homo-
sexual from an individual whose sexual conduct the state could punish as
morally blameworthy,6 to a couple whose marriage the State can find “wor-
thy of dignity.”7 What enabled this tremendous moral and legal transition?
Why have the terms “homosexual,” “lesbian,” and “bisexual” disappeared
with the arrival of Windsor’s dignity? This Article explores the remarkable
journey of the legal homosexual over the last three decades, with a particular
focus on the legal and cultural meanings of the Court’s recent Windsor deci-
sion. The Article reveals how, in three decades, the Court shifted along three
key dimensions in its attitude to the legal homosexual: (1) its characteriza-
tion of the legal homosexual; (2) its moral evaluation of the legal homosex-
ual; and (3) its position on whether and how the state can engage in pure
1 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
2 The “legal homosexual” in this Article refers to the depiction of the homosexual
emerging from judicial rhetoric and decisions about homosexual identity and conduct.
The Article uses “homosexual” to refer to both gay men and lesbians and alternates
between depictions of the homosexual as male and as female.
3 See, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689 (“New York, in common with, as of this
writing, 11 other States and the District of Columbia, decided that same-sex couples
should have the right to marry . . . .”) (emphasis added); id. at 2692 (“New York sought
to give further protection and dignity to that bond. For same-sex couples who wished to
be married, the State acted to give their lawful conduct a lawful status.”) (emphasis
added); id. at 2693 (“DOMA’s unusual deviation from the usual tradition of recognizing
and accepting state definitions of marriage here operates to deprive same-sex couples of
the benefits and responsibilities that come with the federal recognition of their mar-
riages.”) (emphasis added); id. at 2689 (“Slowly at first and then in rapid course, the
laws of New York came to acknowledge the urgency of this issue for same-sex couples
who wanted to affirm their commitment to one another before their children, their family,
their friends, and their community.”) (emphasis added).
4 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified
at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012)), invalidated in part by Windsor,
133 S. Ct. 2675. (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the
United States, the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite
sex who is a husband or a wife.”).
5 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
6 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
7 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692.
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morals legislation.8 In these decades, the Court reversed its approach to the
legal homosexual: the immoral homosexual sodomite in Bowers has changed
into a dignified “same-sex couple” in Windsor. This Article calls this trans-
formation “the metamorphosis of the legal homosexual.”
Windsor’s declaration that several states had “conferred upon [same-
sex couples] a dignity and status of immense import”9 marks the peak of
this legal and moral metamorphosis. This Article argues that while Windsor
is indeed a critical development for equal citizenship, it comes with a severe
impediment. Limping beside the Court’s strong concept of equality is what
this Article calls a “weak dignity.” Windsor’s use of dignity is weak for
three principal reasons. First, the Windsor Court does not present human
dignity as inherent in all humans. Instead, dignity is understood by the Court
to be conferred by individual states at their discretion. Second, and relatedly,
Windsor’s concept of dignity is far narrower than theories of dignity offered
by contemporary moral and legal philosophers. Third, Windsor’s presenta-
tion of dignity assumes that all those in same-sex relationships—and their
children—have been seriously injured and humiliated by laws such as
DOMA. This assumption, I argue, reflects a problematic and self-perpetuat-
ing politics of injury and pity.
Three Parts follow this introduction. Part I traces the metamorphosis of
the legal homosexual from Bowers to Windsor in four phases. The first phase
of the Court’s jurisprudence, the “Immoral Sodomite Phase,” is represented
by Bowers v. Hardwick,10 where homosexuality was understood primarily
through the framework of illicit sex acts and was therefore morally rejected.
The Bowers Court famously declared that there is no constitutional right to
engage in homosexual sodomy.11 The second phase, the “Equal Homosexual
Class Phase,” is typified by Romer v. Evans,12 where the legal homosexual,
no longer understood as a sexual outlaw, was cast as a member of a “class of
citizens” whose exclusion from anti-discrimination protections the Constitu-
tion could not tolerate.13 The Romer majority abandoned the rhetoric of
moral condemnation in favor of moral neutrality and articulated the anti-
animus principle. The third phase, the “Free Intimate Bond Phase,” was an-
nounced in Lawrence v. Texas,14 where the focus shifted to an enduring inti-
mate bond.15 The Lawrence Court for the first time recognized and validated
same-sex intimacy and declared that states can no longer engage in pure
morals legislation.
8 By “pure morals legislation” I mean state regulation of behavior that does not harm
others, based solely on moral disapproval by the majority.
9 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2681.
10 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
11 Id. at 191.
12 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
13 Id. at 633.
14 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
15 Id. at 567.
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The metamorphosis culminates in the “Dignified Married Couple
Phase” launched by Windsor.16 In this pivotal opinion, the Court validated
the decision of several states to “confer” on homosexuals “a dignity and
status of immense import.”17 The legal homosexual has now turned into a
dignified “same-sex couple,” and the terms “homosexual,” “lesbian,” and
“bisexual” have virtually disappeared. These four phases mark the progres-
sion of the legal homosexual.18
Part II examines three conditions that have enabled this moral progress
of the legal homosexual: (1) desexualization; (2) privatization; and (3) coup-
ling and reproduction. It shows how these three conditions crystallized in the
three post-Bowers cases discussed in Part I. Part III critically examines
Windsor’s weak dignity, exploring both its role in the opinion and its prob-
lematic features. The Article concludes with some reflections on how future
courts and advocates can apply the landmark decision of Windsor to enhance
civil rights while sidestepping the weakness of its dignity.
I. A MORAL METAMORPHOSIS: FROM BOWERS TO WINDSOR
From the moral and legal condemnation of homosexual sodomy in
Bowers, we have arrived at the moral and legal dignity of “same-sex
couples” in Windsor. How has the morally bad legal homosexual of Bowers
turned—in three short decades—into the morally good married couple of
Windsor? This Part examines, in four steps, the metamorphosis of the legal
homosexual.
A. Phase One: The Immoral Sodomite
Bowers is our starting point. This decision has been condemned as a
grave mistake19—the Lawrence majority even declared it incorrect from the
moment it was decided.20 Yet revisiting Bowers is critical for our under-
standing of the present. The current “goodness” of some forms of homosex-
uality (e.g., same-sex marriage), as reflected in Windsor, can be fully
understood only through the past legal and historical “badness” of other
forms of homosexuality (e.g., homosexual sodomy), as reflected in Bowers.
Three overlapping themes in Bowers shape the Court’s understanding of
homosexuality. First, the legal homosexual was understood by the Bowers
16 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
17 Id. at 2681.
18 For a graphical summary of these four phases, see infra at Part I.D.3.
19 See, e.g., Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 432 (2011) (“The
analytic problems of the Bowers majority opinion appear almost willful.”).
20 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“Bowers was not correct when it
was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent.”); cf.
Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional Histori-
cism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 681 (2005) (describing the “anti-canon” as a “set of cases
and materials that must be wrong”).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\37-2\HLG202.txt unknown Seq: 6 29-MAY-14 11:30
248 Harvard Journal of Law & Gender [Vol. 37
majority primarily through his illicit sexuality, as a deviant sodomite. Sec-
ond, the Bowers Court, and especially Chief Justice Burger’s concurrence,
accepted Georgia’s characterization of homosexual conduct as immoral.
Third, the Court perceived statutory moral condemnation of homosexual
conduct as legitimate.
1. “Committing that Act”
The Bowers Court viewed the legal homosexual primarily through the
lens of sexual conduct.21 Although sodomy, as defined by the Georgia statute
at the time, could have been—and surely was—committed by heterosexual
couples,22 the Court’s portrayal of the crime focused on homosexual sod-
omy.23 Notably, in Bowers the distinction between homosexual acts and ho-
mosexual identities is far from clear.24 The Bowers majority at times
discussed “the homosexual” as a type of person (an identity),25 but at other
times focused on “homosexual sodomy” (an act).26 As Janet Halley has ar-
gued, Bowers reflects multiple strategic slippages between the framework of
homosexual sodomy and that of homosexual identity.27 Under both para-
21 For a similar perspective, see also Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 118–19 (1967)
(affirming the deportation of an immigrant on the ground that federal law barred entry of
those “afflicted with psychopathic personality,” which the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service interpreted to include all homosexuals) (quoting Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(a)(4), 66 Stat. 163, 182 (repealed 1990)).
22 See Ga. Code Ann. §16-6-2(a)(1) (1984) (“A person commits the offense of sod-
omy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one
person and the mouth or anus of another.”)
23 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 200 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he Court’s almost obsessive focus on homosexual activity is particularly hard to
justify in light of the broad language Georgia has used.”); Janet E. Halley, Romer v.
Hardwick, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 429, 439 (1997) (arguing that Bowers was written from a
heterosexual standpoint, such that heterosexual sodomy could be deemed invisible or
forgotten).
24 For a general distinction between act and identity, see Michel Foucault’s now-fa-
mous observation in the first volume of his History of Sexuality: “As defined by the
ancient civil or canonical codes, sodomy was a category of forbidden acts; their perpetra-
tor was nothing more than the juridical subject of them. The nineteenth-century homosex-
ual became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a
type of life . . . [T]he homosexual was now a species.” 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HIS-
TORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 43 (Robert Hurley, trans., Vintage Books ed.
1990) (1978).
25 See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190 (“The issue presented is whether the Federal
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and
hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still make such conduct illegal and
have done so for a very long time.”) (emphasis added).
26 See, e.g., id. at 187–88 (“In August 1982, respondent Hardwick . . . was charged
with violating the Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy by committing that act with an-
other adult male in the bedroom of respondent’s home.”) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
27 Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In and After Bowers v.
Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1747 (1993)  (“A comparison of the Court’s fundamen-
tal rights holding with its application of rational basis review reveals the advantages of
the majority Justices’ labile strategy by exposing the systematic ways in which acts and
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digms, discussion of the legal homosexual in Bowers was infused with a
sense of deviant sexuality.28
2. Moral Condemnation of Homosexual Conduct
The legal homosexual was portrayed in Bowers as an immoral legal
persona.29 This was made most explicit in Chief Justice Burger’s famous con-
currence, which is dedicated in its entirety to justifying the moral condemna-
tion of homosexual conduct.30 Chief Justice Burger underscored the
majority’s finding that “the proscriptions against sodomy have very ‘ancient
roots,’” 31 and that regulation of “homosexual conduct” has been ongoing
“throughout the history of Western civilization.”32 Therefore, he concluded,
“[t]o hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a
fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching.”33 The
assumption here was that ancient anti-homosexual moral teachings were still
relevant in our times. Otherwise, there would be no problem “casting them
aside.”
A similar, though less explicit, moral critique of homosexuality under-
lay Justice White’s opinion for the majority. Justice White rejected the claim
that the Court’s previous privacy jurisprudence should apply to homosexual
sodomy.34 He argued that cases like Pierce,35 Meyer,36 Griswold,37 Prince,38
Skinner,39 Loving,40 and Roe41 should not be extended to protect homosexual
sodomy; implicit in his argument was the view that those cases involved
desirable social values such as family, marriage, and procreation—a cate-
gory to which homosexuality did not belong:
identities generate incoherence and instability.”); see also Kendall Thomas, The Eclipse
of Reason: A Rhetorical Reading of Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1805, 1813
(1993) (“The Supreme Court’s opinion in Hardwick is more productively understood as
entailing the discursive construction and ideological consolidation of a certain ‘heterosex-
ual’ identity. In upholding the right of the state of Georgia to police and punish the act of
‘homosexual sodomy,’ the Hardwick Court performs an act of heterosexual identification
that produces a distinctive image of heterosexual identity.”).
28 See, e.g., Halley, Romer v. Hardwick, supra note 23, at 434–37; Nan D. Hunter, R
Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 531–32 (1992).
29 See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192 (citing a long history of proscriptions against
sodomy).
30 See id. at 196–97 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
31 Id. at 196 (quoting id. at 192 (majority opinion)); see also id. (“Condemnation of
those practices is firmly rooted in Judaeo-Christian  moral and ethical standards. Homo-
sexual sodomy was a capital crime under Roman law.”).
32 Id.
33 Id. at 197.
34 Id. at 190–91 (majority opinion).
35 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
36 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
37 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
38 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)
39 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
40 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
41 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Accepting the decisions in these cases . . . , we think it evi-
dent that none of the rights announced in those cases bears any
resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to
engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this case. No connec-
tion between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and
homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated, either by
the Court of Appeals or by respondent.42
Justice White viewed homosexual activity as distinguishable from the truly
valuable human domains that were considered by the Court in earlier deci-
sions. Pierce and Meyer protected the parent-child relationship;43 Loving and
Griswold involved marriage and procreation;44 and Roe validated choice in
matters of procreation.45 Homosexual sodomy, by contrast, bears “[n]o con-
nection [to] family, marriage, or procreation,”46 and therefore was not
deemed worthy of the Court’s protection.47
3. The Legitimacy of Morals Legislation
Finally, the Court had to decide whether, in the absence of a “funda-
mental right to commit homosexual sodomy,”48 the state could show a ra-
tional basis for its law. The plaintiffs had argued that there was none, “other
than the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that ho-
mosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable.”49 But the Court was satis-
fied with moral disapproval of homosexual conduct as grounds for
legislation. “The law,” Justice White asserted, “is constantly based on no-
tions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to
be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy
indeed.”50 Laws, according to Bowers, may be legitimate when based on
moral beliefs of the majority of the population, even when these laws regu-
late victimless behavior such as consensual sodomy.
42 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190–91 (1986) (emphasis added).
43 See generally Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
44 See generally Loving, 388 U.S. 1; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
45 See generally Roe, 410 U.S 113.
46 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
47 This narrow definition of privacy was heavily criticized by Justice Blackmun’s dis-
sent and in later scholarship. See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 204–05 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 739–40 (1989)
(“[T]he fundament of the right to privacy is not to be found in the supposed funda-
mentality of what the law proscribes. It is to be found in what the law imposes. . . . This
affirmative power in the law, lying just below its interdictive surface, must be privacy’s
focal point.”); Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431,
1448–60 (1992).
48 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
49 Id. (majority opinion).
50 Id.
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In sum, in three steps the Bowers majority affirmed a state prohibition
on sexual sodomy. First, the Court centered its discussion on sexual conduct,
describing the legal homosexual as one who commits sodomy. Second, the
Court accepted the moral condemnation of the legal homosexual, distin-
guishing homosexual sodomy from socially valuable activities such as mar-
riage, procreation, and the education of children. Third, the Court affirmed
Georgia’s right to engage in pure morals legislation.
B. Phase Two: The Equal Homosexual Class
One decade later, in Romer v. Evans,51 the Court confronted the legal
homosexual again. In this phase, the “Equal Homosexual Class Phase,”
three related changes occurred. First, the legal homosexual was now recast
as a member of a protected class of citizens. Second, the moral evaluation of
the legal homosexual significantly shifted from moral condemnation to
moral neutrality. Third, the Court’s previous deference to pure morals legis-
lation was significantly weakened by the new anti-animus principle. I will
examine each aspect in turn.
1. The Homosexual Class
A ghost opens the Court’s decision in Romer v. Evans. It is the ghost of
Plessy v. Ferguson,52 invoked through Justice Harlan’s dissenting protest that
the Constitution “neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”53 At
stake in Romer was Amendment 2 to the Colorado Constitution,54 which
repealed discrimination protections on the basis of “homosexual, lesbian or
bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships.”55 This, according
to the Court, subjected an entire homosexual class to “discrimination on the
basis of their sexual orientation.”56 As Justice Kennedy explained, “The
amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal pro-
tection from the injuries caused by discrimination . . . .”57 The Court held
that Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.58
Something fascinating happened when the legal homosexual turned into
a class of citizens. Sexuality faded into the background. The legal homosex-
51 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
52 163 U.S. 537, 543, 550–51 (1896) (upholding the constitutionality of state laws
requiring racial segregation in public facilities).
53 Id. at 559.
54 COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b (1992), invalidated by Romer, 517 U.S. 620.
55 Romer, 517 U.S. at 624 (1996) (quoting COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b (1992)).
Amendment 2 also prohibited all other legal forms of state and local protection of homo-
sexuals. Id.
56 Id. at 625.
57 Id. at 627.
58 Id. at 635–36.
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ual in Romer is no longer the sex criminal imagined in Bowers—one who
commits deviant sexual acts that have been condemned for millennia. In
Romer, the homosexual becomes plural, a body of public figures, “a class
we shall refer to as homosexual persons or gays and lesbians.”59 Sodomy is
not mentioned even once by the Romer majority.60 Indeed, from Romer on-
ward, the legal homosexual will be consistently de-sexualized.61
In Romer, the legal homosexual was transformed from a sexual sodom-
ite into a “class of citizens”62 and a “single named group.”63 Ten years after
Bowers, the Court portrayed homosexuality not as individual deviant sex
acts, but as a “single trait” that causes a distinct group of people to suffer
from animus and discrimination.64 One could argue that this shift of focus
from sex acts to class reflects only the different nature of the legal conflicts
in Romer and Bowers. But as Justice Scalia rightly pointed out, Romer’s
class of citizens is made of the same individuals whose sex acts the state
could legitimately criminalize under Bowers.65 As we shall now see, this
shift of focus from homosexual sodomy to a “class of citizens” was not
purely semantic—it critically enabled a judicial reassessment of the moral
value of homosexuals.
2. Moral Neutrality Toward the Homosexual Class
The Romer majority did not opine on whether homosexuals are morally
good or morally bad people.66 Instead, the Court declared a “commitment to
the law’s neutrality where the rights of persons are at stake.”67 This commit-
ment to neutrality, Romer explains, is grounded in the Equal Protection
Clause.68 The Court pointed to concrete harms of discrimination against the
homosexual class,69 underscoring that Amendment 2 “imposes a special dis-
59 Id. at 624.
60 But see id. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The case most relevant to the issue
before us today is not even mentioned in the Court’s opinion: In Bowers v. Hardwick, we
held that the Constitution does not prohibit what virtually all States had done from the
founding of the Republic until very recent years—making homosexual conduct a
crime.”) (citation omitted).
61 Two decades later, in Windsor, the word “homosexual” itself would disappear al-
together, a point to which I will return. See infra Part II.A.
62 Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
63 Id. at 632.
64 Id. at 633.
65 See id. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66 In addition, the word “dignity” does not appear even once in Romer. See id. at 620
(majority opinion).
67 Id. at 623.
68 Id. (“Unheeded then, [Justice Harlan’s] words [in Plessy v. Ferguson] now are
understood to state a commitment to the law’s neutrality where the rights of persons are at
stake. The Equal Protection Clause enforces this principle and today requires us to hold
invalid a provision of Colorado’s Constitution.”).
69 Amendment 2 barred homosexuals from receiving protection through public-ac-
commodations laws, and in transactions involving “housing, sale of real estate, insur-
ance, health and welfare services, private education, and employment.” Id. at 629 (citing
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ability upon those persons alone.”70 While all other citizens enjoyed legal
safeguards against discrimination, homosexuals, under Amendment 2, did
not.71 This stance of moral neutrality fits perfectly with the recasting of the
legal homosexual as a member of a class. The Court did not have to assess
the moral value of individual, physical, sexual homosexuals, and could focus
instead on acts of discrimination against an entire amorphous class.
3. The Anti-Animus Principle
A State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws.
— Romer v. Evans72
A third conceptual shift occurred in Romer when the Court famously
held that animus toward a political group cannot motivate state legislation.73
Amendment 2, according to Romer, “seems inexplicable by anything but
animus toward the class it affects.”74 Thus, “[a] law declaring that in gen-
eral it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to
seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the
laws in the most literal sense.”75 The will to injure another group via legisla-
tion will not be tolerated by the Court.
In 1996, with Bowers still a binding precedent, Romer’s articulation of
the anti-animus principle depended on the premise that homosexuals consti-
tute a class of citizens and not an aggregation of sodomites. Justice Scalia
thus objected by shifting the discussion back to sodomy.76 If moral disap-
Denver, Colo. Rev. Municipal Code, art. IV, §§ 28-93 to 28-95, 28-97 (1991); Boulder,
Colo. Rev. Code §§ 12-1-2, 12-1-3 (1987); Aspen, Colo. Municipal Code §§ 13-98(b),
(c) (1977)).
70 517 U.S. at 631. The concept of disability is interesting in this context. It seems to
imply that having recourse to antidiscrimination laws is a type of “ability,” and its denial
a “disability.” Cf. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J.
728, 750 (2011) (arguing that comparators “constitute, to many courts, a threshold re-
quirement of a discrimination claim and, in that sense, part of discrimination’s very
definition.”).
71 Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
72 Id. at 635.
73 See id. at 632; see also Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13
CONST. COMMENT. 257, 269–70 (1996); Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidi-
ous Intent, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 89, 89–90 (1997); Cass Sunstein, The Supreme
Court, 1995 Term—Forward: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 62
(1996) (“The underlying judgment in Romer must be that, at least for purposes of the
Equal Protection Clause, it is no longer legitimate to discriminate against homosexuals as
a class simply because the state wants to discourage homosexuality or homosexual be-
havior. The state must justify discrimination on some other, public-regarding ground.”).
74 Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
75 Id. at 633.
76 See id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Of course it is our moral heritage that one
should not hate any human being or class of human beings. But I had thought that one
could consider certain conduct reprehensible—murder, for example, or polygamy, or cru-
elty to animals—and could exhibit even ‘animus’ toward such conduct. Surely that is the
only sort of ‘animus’ at issue here: moral disapproval of homosexual conduct, the same
sort of moral disapproval that produced the centuries-old criminal laws that we held con-
stitutional in Bowers.”).
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proval of homosexual conduct is a legitimate state interest under Bowers,
Scalia argued, such disapproval should also be viewed as permissible
grounds for state laws such as Amendment 2.77 The majority did not agree.
In short, the second phase of the metamorphosis of the legal homosex-
ual, the “Equal Homosexual Class Phase,” involved three interrelated shifts.
First, the Court now characterized the legal homosexual as a member of a
class and not as an individual sexual sodomite. Second, the moral status of
homosexuals in the eyes of the Court improved from condemnation to neu-
trality. Third, the idea that animus cannot motivate state legislation weak-
ened the deference to state morals legislation established in Bowers. We will
now see how these factors developed in the third phase of the
metamorphosis.
C. Phase Three: The Free Intimate Bond
In Lawrence, the Court once again considered the validity of a sodomy
statute,78 and this time found it unconstitutional.79 The Court recognized the
liberty interest in an enduring intimate bond.80 Three related shifts occurred
here. First, the legal homosexual was now represented as an enduring inti-
mate bond. Second, that intimate bond was characterized by the Court as
socially valuable. Third, the Court undermined the ability of states to enact
pure morals legislation.
1. The Enduring Intimate Bond
Lawrence famously opens with the declaration that “[l]iberty protects
the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other
private places.”81 It is a private liberty.82 Lawrence not only rejected Bowers’
framing of the legal issue;83 it also presented the legal homosexual in an
entirely new way. The legal homosexual was now understood as “two per-
sons of the same sex . . . engag[ing] in certain intimate sexual conduct.”84
77 See id.; see also ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN
LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 112–13 (1996); Thomas C. Grey, Bowers v. Hard-
wick Diminished, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 373, 384–85 (1997). Indeed, the Lawrence major-
ity, as we will now see, relied on the anti-animus principle when it overruled Bowers. See
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574–75 (2003).
78 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (2003) (“A person commits an offense if he
engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.”).
79 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
80 See id. at 567 (“When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with
another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more
enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right
to make this choice.”).
81 Id. at 562.
82 See infra Part II.B.
83 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
84 Id.
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So while the facts and the legal question in Bowers and Lawrence were
seemingly analogous,85 their characterizations of the legal homosexual were
strikingly different. The Bowers Court conceptualized sodomy as individual
criminal acts. By contrast, the Lawrence Court viewed it as an act of sexual
intimacy. This recasting of the legal homosexual as an intimate bond is con-
ceptually tied to Lawrence’s positing of liberty as a right that protects private
conduct from state intrusion.86 I will return to this point.87 Let us now see
how the new framing of the legal homosexual affected the Court’s moral
appraisal of homosexuality.
2. Moral Recognition of the Enduring Intimate Bond
The shift of attention from “homosexual conduct” to an “enduring inti-
mate bond” laid the groundwork for the Court’s rejection of Bowers’ as-
sumption that homosexuality is not socially valuable.88 Instead, Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority, emphasized that “our laws and tradition
afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and educa-
tion.”89 Quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey,90 Justice Kennedy invoked the dignity to make intimate life choices
as articulated in the abortion context:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and
of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not
85 For the actual history of the parties involved, see generally Dale Carpenter, The
Unknown Past of Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1464 (2004); DALE CARPENTER,
FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF Lawrence v. Texas (2012) [hereinafter CARPENTER,
FLAGRANT CONDUCT].
86 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. This articulation of liberty is a typical instance of a
narrow conception of liberty that philosophers have called “negative liberty.” For an
early distinction between negative and positive liberty, see generally ISAIAH BERLIN, Two
Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, at 118 (1969). Many different ac-
counts of both positive and negative liberty have been proposed since Berlin’s essay was
first published in 1969. See generally Charles Taylor, What’s Wrong with Negative Lib-
erty, in THE IDEA OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ISAIAH BERLIN, at 175 (Alan Ryan
ed., 1979) (distinguishing doctrines of positive liberty, which are concerned with the
exercise of control over one’s own life, from doctrines of negative liberty, which focus on
one’s freedom from constraints).
87 See infra Part II.B.
88 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986); see also supra text accompa-
nying notes 35–47. R
89 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.
90 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (upholding the constitutional right to have an abortion).
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define the attributes of personhood were they formed under com-
pulsion of the State.91
This vaunted process of intimate self-exploration about the meaning of life is
available to the intimate homosexual bond: “Persons in a homosexual rela-
tionship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons
do.”92 Bowers was wrong because it “would deny them this right.”93 Moreo-
ver, in Kennedy’s rendering here, human dignity is attached to the core defi-
nition of liberty, and is possessed by all free persons. The “dignity [of] free
persons,” according to Lawrence, had been violated by sodomy statutes.94
Interestingly, in Lawrence, dignity is paired with the liberty to make intimate
personal choices without government intrusion.95 We will soon see how Jus-
tice Kennedy in United States v. Windsor96 articulated a different, weaker
conception of dignity—“equal dignity”97—that is not inherent in individuals
but is conferred by the State.
But not all homosexual conduct was considered socially valuable in
Lawrence. Justice Kennedy’s decision drew a clear line between legitimate
and illegitimate sexual conduct. Forms of sex involving minors, injury or
coercion, public conduct, or prostitution were all treated as morally and le-
gally blameworthy.98 By contrast, the private conduct of two consenting
adults drew no censure.99 Indeed, in Lawrence, such private conduct rose to
a level of moral validation that is more robust than the simple moral neutral-
ity of Romer. With terms such as “dignity,”100 “respect,”101 and the “mys-
tery of human life,”102 the Court signaled moral recognition and validation of
a certain type of legal homosexual: the one who has entered an intimate
bond with another.
91 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (emphasis added) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 567; see also id. (“The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosex-
ual persons the right” to choose to enter upon relationships “in the confines of their
homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.”) (empha-
sis added).
95 See Neomi Rao, The Trouble with Dignity and Rights of Recognition, 99 VA. L.
REV. ONLINE 29, 33 (2013), http://www.virginialawreview.org/sites/virginialawreview.
org/files/Rao.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/WTF4-KDG7.
96 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
97 See infra Part III.
98 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The present case does not involve minors. It does
not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships
where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or
prostitution.”).
99 Id.
100 E.g., id. at 567.
101 E.g., id. at 575.
102 Id. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992)).
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3. The “End of Morals Legislation”?
The Lawrence majority thus embraced one of the primary claims of
twentieth-century legal positivism: the State should not be in the business of
pure morals legislation.103 Even if condemnation of homosexuality is some-
times based on “profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and
moral principles,” the majority of the population can no longer enforce its
moral views through criminal law.104 “The liberty of all” prevails over the
moral convictions of the many,105 and “the fact that the governing majority
in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”106 Thus Bow-
ers was overruled.107
Justice Scalia objected.108 He criticized the majority for taking sides in a
“culture war,”109 and warned that there were many morals-based state laws
that would now be hard to defend, including “bigamy, same-sex marriage,
adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and
obscenity.”110 In fact, he famously protested, “[t]his effectively decrees the
end of all morals legislation. If, as the Court asserts, the promotion of
majoritarian sexual morality is not even a legitimate state interest, none of
the above-mentioned laws can survive rational-basis review.”111 At least
some of the items on Justice Scalia’s list are easily distinguishable from sod-
103 See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 1–6 (1963) (distinguishing
laws informed by morality from those motivated purely by moral condemnation but no
evidence of harm to others). But cf. Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm
Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 113 (1999) (“The harm principle is effec-
tively collapsing under the weight of its own success. Claims of harm have become so
pervasive that the harm principle has become meaningless: the harm principle no longer
serves the function of a critical principle because non-trivial harm arguments permeate
the debate. Today, the issue is no longer whether a moral offense causes harm, but rather
what type and what amounts of harms the challenged conduct causes, and how the harms
compare. . . . This is a radical departure from the liberal theoretic, progressive discourse
of the 1960s.”).
104 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571.
105 Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 850).
106 Id. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
107 Id. at 578.
108 Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 602. But see Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: “You Are Entering a Gay and
Lesbian Free Zone”: On the Radical Dissents of Justice Scalia and Other (Post-Queers)
[Raising Questions about Lawrence, Sex Wars, and the Criminal Law], 94 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 503, 506 (2004) [hereinafter Harcourt, Gay and Lesbian Free Zone]
(“The fact is, there is today a war of sexual projects that is being fought on American
soil, and the federal courts, including the United States Supreme Court, are inextricably
caught up in the ongoing battles. But what is missing in Justice Scalia’s critique are the
important nuances and subtleties that shape these contemporary sex wars, that make them
so fascinating and so unpredictable—and that both resignify and ambiguate the purported
gay victory in Lawrence.”).
110 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111 Id. (first emphasis added).  Although he joined the dissent of Justice Scalia, Justice
Thomas wrote separately. He argued not for the legitimacy of morals legislation but for
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omy prohibitions, because legislators can identify potential victims that
could be protected by regulating activities such as bigamy and prostitution.
But Lawrence’s threat to Scalia’s pro-morals legislation approach is nonethe-
less real in that it recognizes a liberty under the Due Process Clause to en-
gage in forms of private sexual activity that the majority of the population
may disapprove of.
In sum, in the third phase of our metamorphosis we find three main
developments. First, the depiction of the legal homosexual has transformed
into an enduring intimate bond that is protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, the moral value of this bond has
increased from moral neutrality toward the homosexual class, to a moral
validation and recognition of the enduring intimate bond. Third, after Law-
rence, moral condemnation in and of itself can no longer justify criminal
prohibitions on private sexual behavior.112
D. Phase Four: The Dignified Married Couple
In 2013, the Windsor Court struck down Section 3 of the Defense of
Marriage Act as an unconstitutional violation of the Fifth Amendment.113
Windsor is a fascinating social and legal development, even a culmination,
in the moral transformation of the legal homosexual. It reflects a three-dec-
ade shift of the legal homosexual from a morally condemned persona to a
morally good and dignified one. The Court does this mostly through a novel
use of the concept of dignity.114
Three shifts occurred in Windsor. First, the legal homosexual is now
consistently represented as a “same-sex couple” or a “same-sex marriage,”
while the term “homosexual” has virtually disappeared.115 Second, the moral
assessment of the legal homosexual has now crossed over from moral recog-
nition to moral praise. Third, states that issue marriage licenses to same-sex
couples are now increasingly understood by the Court to be engaging in the
opposite of pure morals legislation. Several states now confer dignity—a
positive moral value—upon same-sex couples. But before turning to the
the illegitimacy of judicial invalidation of a statute without sufficient warrant in the Con-
stitution. See id. at 605–06 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
112 Cf. Harcourt, Gay and Lesbian Free Zone, supra note 109, at 503–04 (“For the R
first time in the history of American criminal law, the United States Supreme Court has
declared that a supermajoritarian moral belief does not necessarily provide a rational
basis for criminalizing conventionally deviant conduct. The Court’s ruling is the coup de
graˆce to legal moralism administered after a prolonged, brutish, tedious, and debilitating
struggle against liberal legalism in its various criminal law representations.”) (footnote
omitted).
113 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013).
114 Whereas some scholars, as we will now see, have focused on the doctrinal mean-
ing of dignity in Windsor, this Article examines dignity as a moral status conferred by the
State.
115 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675.
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three key elements of Windsor’s contribution to the metamorphosis of the
legal homosexual, we must examine the holding of the case.
In the short time since Windsor’s publication, a flurry of views has ap-
peared regarding its exact holding and doctrinal underpinnings.116 Scholars
and commentators have focused their analysis on equal protection,117 dig-
nity,118 liberty,119 federalism,120 and the right to marry.121 Windsor’s compli-
cated holding indeed combines elements of federalism, equal protection, and
116 See, e.g., William Baude, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage After
Windsor, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 150, 154 (2013); Linda C. McClain, From Romer v.
Evans to United States v. Windsor: Law as a Vehicle for Moral Disapproval in Amend-
ment 2 and the Defense of Marriage Act, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 351, 461
(2013), http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1244&context=
djglp, archived at http://perma.cc/D82V-LUB8; Douglas NeJaime, Windsor’s Right to
Marry, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE  219, 220–21 (2013), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/
1205_3mchpr78.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/67JT-QRPQ; Rao, supra note 95, at R
30–31; Ernest A. Young, United States v. Windsor and the Role of State Law in Defining
Rights Claims, 99 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 39, 47 (2013), http://www.virginialawreview.org/
sites/virginialawreview.org/files/Young_Final.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/KZT6-
SUGQ.
117 See, e.g., McClain, supra note 116, at 353 (“In United States v. Windsor, Justice R
Kennedy employed Romer[’s Equal Protection rationale] as a template in an opinion on
the merits, in which the Court affirmed the Second Circuit judgment that Section 3 of the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was unconstitutional.”) (footnote omitted); Suzanne
Goldberg, A One-Two Punch to the Nation’s Most Prominent Antigay Laws, SCOTUS-
BLOG (June 26, 2013, 2:07 p.m.), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/a-one-two-punch-
to-the-nations-most-prominent-antigay-laws/, archived at http://perma.cc/4WYG-NJEX
[hereinafter Goldberg, One-Two Punch] (“[W]hat is most striking about the opinion . . .
is the direct, clear way that the Court seems to understand why DOMA is such an egre-
gious violation of the constitution’s equality guarantee under the Fifth Amendment.”).
118 See, e.g., Rao, supra note 95, at 29 (arguing that an “unusual [dignity-based] R
right to recognition . . . forms the basis of the Court’s decision,” and that a “right to
recognition, standing alone, has never been part of our constitutional jurisprudence”). But
see Young, supra note 116, at 47 (“The right of ‘recognition’ in Windsor, then, was not R
some untethered judicial creation, but rather an entitlement to federal recognition of state
law rights created in the democratic exercise of the states’ reserved powers. That right is
utterly familiar—and fundamental.”).
119 See Baude, supra note 116, at 155 (“Windsor contains a second theme as well R
. . . . The idea is that a state law recognizing or creating a marriage also creates a constitu-
tional liberty interest.”).
120 See id. at 154 (“Windsor uses two lines of reasoning in invalidating Section 3 of
DOMA . . . . The latter line of reasoning is the opinion’s much-debated references to
federalism.”); Courtney G. Joslin, Windsor, Federalism, and Family Equality, 113
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 156, 158 (2013), http://columbialawreview.org/windsor-feder-
alism-and-family-equality/, archived at http://perma.cc/9ADD-S9AL (“[C]ivil rights ad-
vocates dodged a bullet when the Windsor Court declined to embrace the categorical
family status federalism theory. While its acceptance would have brought along the short-
term gain of providing a basis for invalidating DOMA, it also would have curtailed the
ability of federal officials to protect same-sex couples and other families.”); Young,
supra note 116, at 46 (“Contrary to the emerging narrative, then, the federalism argu- R
ments in Windsor amounted to much more than just ‘some blather about traditional state
sovereignty and marriage.’” (quoting Sandy Levinson, A Brief Comment on Justice Ken-
nedy’s Opinion in Windsor, BALKINIZATION (June 26, 2013, 11:50 PM), http://balkin.
blogspot.com/2013/06/a-brief-comment-on-justice-kennedys.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/Q9KS-P2H6).
121 See NeJaime, supra note 116, at 220 (“Indeed, if we look more closely at Wind- R
sor, we see that it is conceptually, if not doctrinally, a right-to-marry case. Justice Ken-
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dignity. While equal protection language and precedents appear throughout
the decision,122 these combine with federalism and dignity, as captured in the
majority’s conclusion:
The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes
the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the
State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and
dignity. By seeking to displace this protection and treating those
persons as living in marriages less respected than others, the fed-
eral statute is in violation of the Fifth Amendment.123
Here we see how these three elements of Windsor (federalism, dignity,
and equality) merge. This is a federalism decision in the sense that the Court
recognizes the historic priority of the states in defining and regulating civil
marriages.124 When a state defines who can enter marriages within its bound-
aries, the federal government must show deference to such a decision.125 The
concept of dignity is closely tied to this point.126 The State, according to
Windsor, can decide whether or not to grant dignity to same-sex couples by
recognizing their marriages.127 A state decision to confer dignity results in
nedy, writing for the majority, repeatedly sketches the contours of the right to marry in
relation to same-sex couples.”).
122 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013) (“What the State
of New York treats as alike the federal law deems unlike by a law designed to injure the
same class the State seeks to protect.”); see also id. (“DOMA rejects the long-established
precept that the incidents, benefits, and obligations of marriage are uniform for all mar-
ried couples within each State . . . .”). The decision also held that discriminations “of an
unusual character especially suggest careful consideration to determine whether they are
obnoxious to the constitutional provision,” id. (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633
(1996)), and that the “Constitution’s guarantee of equality ‘must at the very least mean
that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot’ justify
disparate treatment of that group,” id. at 2693 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973)).
123 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (emphasis added).
124 See id. at 2691–92.
125 See id. at 2693.
126 See id. at 2695–96; see also id. at 2691 (“The significance of state responsibilities
for the definition and regulation of marriage dates to the Nation’s beginning; for ‘when
the Constitution was adopted the common understanding was that the domestic relations
of husband and wife and parent and child were matters reserved to the States.’”) (quoting
Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383–84 (1930)).
127 Id. at 2692 (“The dynamics of state government in the federal system are to allow
the formation of consensus respecting the way the members of a discrete community treat
each other in their daily contact and constant interaction with each other,” and “[w]hen
the State used its historic and essential authority to define the marital relation in this way
[i.e. marriage equality], its role and its power in making the decision enhanced the recog-
nition, dignity, and protection of the class in their own community.”). As of this Article’s
publication, the following states and the District of Columbia have recognized same-sex
marriages: Washington, California, Iowa, New York, Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland, Delaware, Rhode Island, Minnesota, Illinois,
New Jersey, and New Mexico. Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights, Summary of Laws Regarding
Same-Sex Couples, http://www.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Relationship_
Recognition_State_Laws_Summary.pdf (last updated Mar. 24, 2014), archived at http://
perma.cc/W7BS-SEVT. Michigan, Virginia, Texas, Oklahoma, and Utah have also had
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equality between same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples. Section 3 of
DOMA thus interfered with the equal protection and dignity (i.e., the “equal
dignity”) of same-sex couples in those states.128
Why did the Windsor majority need this complicated approach when it
could have invalidated Section 3 using a pure equality rationale under the
Fifth Amendment? The Court could have held that Section 3 of DOMA vio-
lated the equal protection of all lesbians, gays and bisexuals in the United
States. But it did not.129 It articulated a much narrower class: “[t]he Class to
which DOMA directs its restrictions and restraints are those persons who are
joined in same-sex marriages made lawful by the State. DOMA singles out a
class of persons deemed by a State entitled to recognition and protection to
enhance their own liberty.”130 The protected class includes only those same-
sex couples who married in jurisdictions that had enabled them to do so.131
This narrow framing of the class allowed the Court to avoid a decision much
broader in scope and implication.132 If the Court had framed the class as all
same-sex couples in the United States and struck down Section 3 of DOMA
as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment, an
identical logic could have arguably applied to existing state marriage exclu-
sions under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Windsor’s combination of principles of federalism, equality, and dignity ena-
bled the Court to invalidate Section 3 of DOMA while leaving its state
equivalents intact.133 Indeed, the dissenters emphasized that, after Windsor, it
is still legitimate at the state level to confer dignity on opposite-sex couples
but not on same-sex couples.134
state constitutional bans on same-sex marriage struck down by federal courts, with ap-
peals pending. Id.
128 Id. at 2692 (“[T]he resulting injury and indignity [from DOMA] is a deprivation
of an essential part of the liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment.”) (emphasis added).
129 I thank Linda McClain for a lively discussion of this point with me.
130 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695 (Kennedy, J.) (emphasis added).
131 See id. at 2696.
132 See Young, supra note 116, at 43 (“The beauty of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in R
Windsor is that it was able to resolve this difficult issue without resort to judicial fiat.
Instead, the Court relied on New York’s own resolution of that question, which was ulti-
mately—and appropriately—a political one.”).
133 See Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial
Equality, 127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 154 (2013) (“[N]either Windsor nor Hollingsworth
forces any action upon the states, some of which continue to have large majorities op-
posed to gay marriage. . . . Windsor did not challenge the constitutionality of section 2 of
DOMA, which authorizes states to decline to recognize same-sex marriages lawfully per-
formed elsewhere. Such rulings are unlikely to generate any significant backlash.”).
134 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2720 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“To the extent that the
Court takes the position that the question of same-sex marriage should be resolved prima-
rily at the state level, I wholeheartedly agree. I hope that the Court will ultimately permit
the people of each State to decide this question for themselves.”); id. at 2696 (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting) (“[W]hile I disagree with the result to which the majority’s analysis
leads it in this case, I think it more important to point out that its analysis leads no further.
The Court does not have before it, and the logic of its opinion does not decide, the
distinct question whether the States, in the exercise of their ‘historic and essential author-
ity to define the marital relation,’ . . . may continue to utilize the traditional definition of
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Part III will criticize Windsor’s “weak dignity” for reasons wholly dif-
ferent from those of the Windsor dissenters. Let us see now, however, why
Windsor should be understood as the culmination of the metamorphosis of
the legal homosexual.
1. The “Same-Sex Couple”
In Windsor, the legal homosexual turned into a “same-sex couple.” The
majority introduced the plaintiff, Edith Windsor, and her deceased spouse,
Thea Spyer, as “[t]wo women then resident in New York [who] were mar-
ried in a lawful ceremony in Ontario, Canada, in 2007.”135 Edith and Thea
appear in Windsor by reference to their biological sex (“two women”) and
not their sexuality (two lesbians). Although their sexual relationship began
in the 1960s, many years before they were to become “[t]wo women . . .
married in a lawful ceremony,”136 the Court portrays their 2007 marriage as
the landmark of their lives.137
The glaring absence of references to sexuality and sexual orientation in
the Court’s decision is not particular to descriptions of Edith and Thea.
Throughout Windsor, the terms “homosexual” and “lesbian” are replaced
with “same-sex couples” and “same-sex marriage.”138 The word “lesbian”
does not appear in the majority’s decision even once.139 With this rhetorical
transition to “same-sex couples” and “same-sex marriage,” Windsor erased
the “lesbian” and the “homosexual” in what is, to this point, the most im-
portant Court decision in the decade for gay, lesbian, and bisexual rights.
As various scholars have observed, the Court in Romer had erased
bisexuals, present in the statute at issue, from the definition of the class
vindicated by the decision in the case.140 Although Colorado’s Amendment 2
marriage.”) (citing id. at 2692 (majority opinion)). But see Mike Dorf, First Takes on
DOMA and Prop 8 Rulings, DORF ON LAW (June 26, 2013, 10:58 a.m.), http://www.
dorfonlaw.org/2013/06/first-takes-on-doma-and-prop-8-rulings.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/J7RY-VX62 (“[Roberts’ position] strikes me as technically correct but wrong
on the big picture. Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Windsor is chock full of language that, if
taken seriously, would surely invalidate state bans on [same-sex marriages].”).
135 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682.
136 Id.
137 See id. at 2683 (“Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer met in New York City in 1963
and began a long-term relationship. Windsor and Spyer registered as domestic partners
when New York City gave that right to same-sex couples in 1993.”).
138 E.g. id. at 2689.
139 The term appears for the first time in quoted material in Justice Scalia’s dissent. Id.
at 2711 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Likewise, the word “gay” appears only in the dissenting
opinions, e.g. id. at 2708, and the words “homosexual” and “homosexuality” in the
majority opinion appear only in quoted material referring to the House of Representa-
tives’ enactment of DOMA in 1996, id. at 2693 (majority opinion).
140 See, e.g., Michael Boucai, Sexual Liberty and Same-Sex Marriage: An Argument
from Bisexuality, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 415, 452–53 (2012) (“Bisexuality is ‘virtually
invisible’ in same-sex marriage litigation. Though many of the organizations that serve as
plaintiffs’ advocates or amici purport in their mission statements to represent bisexuals
along with gay men, lesbians, and sometimes, transgender people, these are the very
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announced that there would be “No Protected Status Based on Homosexual,
Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation,”141 Justice Kennedy’s decision referred to
the “named class” protected by the ordinances “as homosexual persons or
gays and lesbians.”142 Bisexuality was left out. The Court’s erasure of bisex-
uals in Romer was in keeping with a broader societal trend toward what
Kenji Yoshino calls “the epistemic contract of bisexual erasure.”143 In an
article by that name, Yoshino argues that self-identified homosexuals and
heterosexuals seek to erase bisexual identity because, among other reasons,
they have a shared “interest in defending norms of monogamy.”144 Romer is
just one instance of this widespread phenomenon.
What the Court did in Windsor is even more striking. For the Court in
Windsor to erase the terms “homosexual,” “lesbian,” and “gay” is cultur-
ally anomalous. This move nonetheless fits well within the logic of the
Court’s decision. Windsor seems to leave us with a new binary: married/non-
married. For this binary, sexual orientation does not matter. Those who are
married, as we will now see, are granted dignity through marriage licenses,
while those who are not are left without that blessing.
2. Moral Dignity of Married “Same-Sex” Couples
You know the Catholic hierarchy has been awful, but the Catholic
people and the families and friends and people who care as Jesus
did about the marginalized and treating them with dignity . . . I
think Jesus is weeping for joy.
— Andrew Sullivan
(CNN interview with Anderson Cooper)145
Windsor is a pivotal moment in the metamorphosis of the legal homo-
sexual. The legal homosexual, at least in states where same-sex marriage is
legally recognized, is portrayed as a morally dignified person. As Justice
groups that most concertedly ignore bisexual existence. If the subject surfaces at all in
these cases, it is same-sex marriage opponents who raise it. However fleeting and infre-
quent, conservative invocations of bisexuality shed light on the reasons for ‘LGBT’ advo-
cates’ meticulous avoidance of the subject.”) (footnote and citation omitted); Kenji
Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353, 367 (2000).
141 COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b (1992)) (emphasis added).
142 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996).
143 Yoshino, supra note 140, at 362; see also id. (“It is as if these two groups, despite R
their other virulent disagreements, have agreed that bisexuals will be made invisible. I
call this the epistemic contract of bisexual erasure. To support the existence of such a
contract, I adduce evidence that self-identified straights and self-identified gays both de-
ploy the same three strategies of bisexual erasure: class erasure, individual erasure, and
delegitimation.”).
144 Id. (“[T]he investments that both self-identified straights and self-identified gays
have in bisexual erasure . . . are: (1) an interest in stabilizing sexual orientation; (2) an
interest in retaining sex as a dominant metric of differentiation; and (3) an interest in
defending norms of monogamy.”).
145 Anderson Cooper 360° (CNN television broadcast June 28, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/9TQB-B5LQ (interview of Andrew Sullivan and Evan Wolfson) [herein-
after Anderson Cooper 360°].
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Kennedy explained, “[r]esponsibilities, as well as rights, enhance the dig-
nity and integrity of the person.”146 By granting them the responsibilities and
rights of marriage, states “conferred upon [same-sex couples] a dignity and
status of immense import,”147 and “enhanced the recognition, dignity, and
protection of the class in their own community.”148 Section 3 of DOMA took
all of that away,149 and was thus declared unconstitutional.150
The Windsor decision assumes that marriage makes the legal homosex-
ual more moral, and that the State affirms this by granting marriage licenses.
Unfortunately, Windsor does not explain how marriage licenses elevate the
moral status of those who marry. What makes marriage licenses any differ-
ent from drivers’ licenses or fishing licenses?151 Why do licenses for driving
or fishing not confer dignity on those who obtain them? One cannot reasona-
bly claim, for instance, that the “responsibilities, as well as rights,” that
come with a fishing license “enhance the dignity and integrity of the per-
son.”152 Such a claim would be meaningful only in a legal culture where
fishing is an activity of great moral significance.153
Two rationales have appeared in the last two decades to support the idea
of moral elevation through marriage: One can be characterized as sacralizing
(the “sacralizing rationale”) and the other as normalizing (the “normalizing
rationale”). While Windsor does not explicitly rely on either rationale, the
repeated assertion that marriage enhances dignity is hardly intelligible with-
out them. I will briefly introduce each rationale.
Under the sacralizing rationale, as Michael Warner has aptly observed,
both sides of the same-sex marriage debates “seek from state-sanctioned
146 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013)
147 Id. at 2681.
148 Id. at 2692; see also id. at 2689 (“[U]ntil recent years, many citizens had not
even considered the possibility that two persons of the same sex might aspire to occupy
the same status and dignity as that as of a man and woman in lawful marriage.”); Martha
C. Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 667, 670 (2010) (“[I]t seems to
most people that the state, by giving a marriage license, expresses approval, and, by
withholding it, disapproval.”).
149 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694 (“DOMA contrives to deprive some couples married
under the laws of their State, but not other couples, of both rights and responsibilities.”).
150 Id. at 2695.
151 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2082
(2005) (“As an official matter, marriage is no more and no less than a government-run
licensing system.”); see also Samuel L. Bray, Preventive Adjudication, 77 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1275, 1306–09 (2010) (noting that marriage is one of many statuses that are recog-
nized by law and clarified by adjudication). See generally Mary Anne Case, Marriage
Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758 (2005) (examining ways in which the institution of civil
marriage functions as a licensing scheme, and drawing analogies to licensing for drivers
of automobiles, owners of dogs, and the provision of corporate charters).
152 I thank Katherine Franke for pointing this analogy out to me.
153 For examples of local fishing and lobstering communities that just might qualify,
however, see, for example, ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGH-
BORS SETTLE DISPUTES 218–19 (1991); Carol M. Rose, Response, 19 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 1057, 1058–59 (2011).
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marriage what is essentially a sacralization.”154 By this Warner means that
marriage recognition is comparable in rhetoric and substance to the kind of
respect that individuals often seek from religious institutions. State-sanc-
tioned marriage is thus understood as providing moral validation to individu-
als.155 Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,156 in which the
Massachusetts Supreme Court recognized same-sex marriages, provides an
excellent example of the sacralizing rationale:
The union of two people contemplated by [the Massachusetts stat-
ute] “is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully en-
during, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or
social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as
any involved in our prior decisions.”157
In characterizing civil marriage as sacred and noble, Goodridge echoed
Griswold, where the Court justified the constitutional right to privacy
through the sanctity of the marital bedroom.158 Windsor does not tell us how
or why marriage enhances the dignity of those who enter it, but the percep-
tion of marriage as sacred provides one of the strongest conceptual links to
human dignity. Under the sacralizing rationale, marriage enhances the moral
dignity of the married legal homosexual because the institution itself is
sacred.159
154 Michael Warner, Response to Martha Nussbaum, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 721, 729
(2010) (explaining that “[t]he opponents of same-sex marriage are generally more ex-
plicit—outside the courtroom, at least—that sacralization is what they are after,” and
that, on the other side, marriage equality advocates “more typically describe an effect of
sacralization in nominally secular terms, such as ‘special status’ and ‘transcendent
significance’”).
155 See Lisa Duggan, Holy Matrimony!, THE NATION, Mar. 15, 2004, at 18, archived
at http://perma.cc/WCV6-A3F6 (arguing for abolition of “state endorsement of the sanc-
tified religious wedding” or for “ending the use of the term ‘marriage’ altogether”).
156 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
157 Id. at 973 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)) (emphasis
added).
158 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (1965) (“Would we allow the police to search the
sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for the telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?”).
A number of other Supreme Court cases also discuss the deep human significance of the
institution of marriage. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987) (“[M]any religions
recognize marriage as having spiritual significance . . . .”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 12 (1967) (describing the freedom to marry as a right that “has long been recognized
as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men” and which is “fundamental to our very existence and survival”); Williams v. North
Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942) (describing marriage as “an institution more basic in
our civilization than any other”).
159  Accordingly, some critics have suggested that states should abolish civil marriage
altogether and leave the business of sacralizing unions to religious institutions. See, e.g.,
Edward A. Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage: The Pro-Marriage Case for Abolishing
Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2006) (“[I]t is time to abolish civil
marriage. The law should not define, regulate, or recognize marriage. Marriage—the
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By contrast, the normalizing rationale is not theological in essence. It is
motivated by the more modern necessity to govern large populations effec-
tively. This twofold normalizing rationale centers on how same-sex marriage
can potentially (1) facilitate more efficient state governance of same-sex
couples and their children, and (2) “improve” the moral behavior of individ-
ual homosexual actors. The former is more functional and can hardly be
linked with morality or dignity; the latter cannot be understood without
them. I will briefly explain.
For the view of marriage as necessary for efficient governance, Good-
ridge is again exemplary:
Civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable
relationships over transient ones. It is central to the way the Com-
monwealth identifies individuals, provides for the orderly distribu-
tion of property, ensures that children and adults are cared for and
supported whenever possible from private rather than public funds,
and tracks important epidemiological and demographic data.160
Civil marriage anchors social order.161 It helps the government with its pri-
mary task of managing the population; it provides a useful structure for dis-
tributing property and immigration benefits, ordering the private care of
children and adults, and controlling disease.162
More importantly, the second part of the normalizing rationale is of
crucial significance for the metamorphosis traced here. A well-known argu-
ment that marriage could morally improve the sexual behavior of homosexu-
als was offered by Andrew Sullivan in Virtually Normal.163 Sullivan
famously announced a new era of homosexual politics, in which homosexu-
als will be integrated into the two most important public institutions: the
structured, publicly-proclaimed, communally-supported relationship of mutual commit-
ment—should become solely a religious and cultural institution with no legal definition
or status.”); Douglas W. Kmiec & Shelley Ross Saxer, Equality in Substance and in
Name, S.F. GATE (Mar. 2, 2009, 4:00 a.m.), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/Equal-
ity-in-substance-and-in-name-3249218.php, archived at http://perma.cc/6W7X-4VT5
(recommending that the California Supreme Court “direct the state to employ non-mar-
riage terminology for all couples—be it civil union or some equivalent” and explaining
that this “dovetails with the court’s important responsibility to reaffirm the unfettered
freedom of all faiths to extend the nomenclature of marriage as their traditions allow.”).
160 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954. See also id. at 965 (“That same-sex couples are
willing to embrace marriage’s solemn obligations of exclusivity, mutual support, and
commitment to one another is a testament to the enduring place of marriage in our laws
and in the human spirit.”).
161 Id. at 954; see also, e.g., MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, JUST MARRIAGE 113–15
(2004).
162 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954; see also Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 883
(Iowa 2009); SHANLEY, supra note 161, at 113–15. R
163 See ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT HOMOSEX-
UALITY 178–85 (1995).
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military and civil marriage.164 Marriage especially “is the highest public rec-
ognition of personal integrity.”165 Without it, sexuality is on the loose.166 In a
disturbing (yet telling) allusion, Sullivan predicted that marriage would be
the first step toward the resolution of “the homosexual question.”167 Sulli-
van’s idealization of personal monogamous commitments, which has been
subject to extensive scholarly scrutiny,168 has also echoed in judicial recogni-
tion of same-sex marriages.169
Without explicitly relying on either the sacralizing or normalizing ratio-
nales, Windsor articulated a direct causal link between civil marriage and an
elevated moral recognition of same-sex couples. Windsor thus completed the
metamorphosis of the legal homosexual into a morally good legal actor. This
did not escape the well-attuned radar of Justice Scalia, who harshly criticized
the majority for “clums[il]y” stepping into a debate that should be resolved
through democratic means.170 Justice Scalia criticized the majority’s decision
164 See id. at 178 (arguing that the centerpiece for this new politics, “[t]he critical
measure for this politics of public equality—private freedom is . . . equal access to civil
marriage.”).
165 Id. at 179. See also id. at 182 (asserting that marriage “provides an anchor . . . in
the maelstrom of sex and relationships to which we are all prone . . . [and it is] a mecha-
nism for emotional stability and economic security”).
166 Id. at 182. (“[W]e recognize that not to promote marriage would be to ask too
much of human virtue.”).
167 Id. at 185 (arguing that gay marriage “is a profoundly humanizing, traditional-
izing step. It is . . . more important than any other institution, since it is the most central
institution to the nature of the problem, which is to say, the emotional and sexual bond
between one human being and another.”).
168 See, e.g., LISA DUGGAN, THE TWILIGHT OF EQUALITY?: NEOLIBERALISM, CUL-
TURAL POLITICS, AND THE ATTACK ON DEMOCRACY 55–64 (2003); MICHAEL WARNER,
THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE 136–41
(1999).
169 See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954–55 (“Civil marriage is at once a deeply per-
sonal commitment to another human being and a highly public celebration of the ideals of
mutuality, companionship, intimacy, fidelity, and family. . . . Because it fulfils yearnings
for security, safe haven, and connection that express our common humanity, civil mar-
riage is an esteemed institution, and the decision whether and whom to marry is among
life’s momentous acts of self-definition.”) (emphasis added). Interestingly, this percep-
tion of marriage as a training camp for virtue has been applied to opposite-sex marriages
as well. At least two courts since Lawrence have rejected same-sex marriage challenges
under the theory that homosexuals cannot engage in “accidental procreation,” and thus
do not need marriage. See, e.g., Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 35 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006). Under this surprising logic,
marriage is a way to tame only those irresponsible actors whose sexual behavior may lead
to unwanted pregnancies. See Katherine Franke, Dignifying Rights: A Comment on Jer-
emy Waldron’s Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1177, 1192 (2011)
[hereinafter Franke, Dignifying Rights] (commenting, in relation to Morrison and Her-
nandez, that “morality, in the form of dignity and responsibility, doesn’t obviously cut in
any predictable direction when it comes to elaborating the civil rights of gay men and
lesbians.”).
170 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2710 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see
also id. at 2707 (“[T]he Constitution neither requires nor forbids our society to approve
of same-sex marriage, much as it neither requires nor forbids us to approve of no-fault
divorce, polygamy, or the consumption of alcohol.”); id. at 2710 (“Few public controver-
sies touch an institution so central to the lives of so many, and few inspire such attendant
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for labeling opponents of same-sex marriage as “enemies of the human
race”171 and “haters of the neighbor.”172 Justice Scalia may have anticipated
that Windsor would be read as the complete inversion of Bowers in this
regard.173 If in Bowers the legal homosexual was the morally condemned
character, in Windsor the morally condemned character is the one who does
not support same-sex marriage. This scandalous reversal now names as “hat-
ers of the neighbor” those who are religiously commanded to “love thy
neighbor.” Oddly (or perhaps not), in its invocation of that religious com-
mand, Justice Scalia’s dissent converges with Andrew Sullivan’s response to
Windsor in the epigraph above.174 “Jesus is weeping for joy,” said Sullivan.
The marginalized, stigmatized, shamed minority has been granted moral dig-
nity.175 It is now unchristian to oppose same-sex marriage.
3. “Positive” Morals Legislation
Like the Wizard of Oz, the State now marks the legal homosexual with
dignity.176 Interestingly, in the aftermath of Lawrence’s “end of all morals
legislation,”177 Windsor offers a new type of State morals legislation for the
legal homosexual—one that comes in the form of moral praise. Under Wind-
sor, states have the power to confer dignity by granting marriage licenses,
and, by so doing, to confer positive moral value upon the legal (married)
homosexual. Thus whereas it is no longer legitimate to prohibit some forms
of private sexual conduct solely based on moral disapproval by the commu-
nity,178 it is quite possible, according to Windsor, to convey moral approval
through marriage licensing. For many readers, this welcome development
may not seem puzzling at all; it fits well with our liberal intuitions. But from
a perspective of moral and legal transformation, positive morals legislation
passion by good people on all sides. . . . Since DOMA’s passage, citizens on all sides of
the question have seen victories and they have seen defeats. There have been plebiscites,
legislation, persuasion, and loud voices—in other words, democracy.”).
171 Id. at 2709.
172 Id. at 2711 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In the majority’s telling, this story is black-
and-white: Hate your neighbor or come along with us. The truth is more complicated. It is
hard to admit that one’s political opponents are not monsters . . . .”).
173 See id. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“As I have observed before, the Constitu-
tion does not forbid the government to enforce traditional moral and sexual norms. . . . I
will not swell the U.S. Reports with restatements of that point. It is enough to say that the
Constitution neither requires nor forbids our society to approve of same-sex marriage,
much as it neither requires nor forbids us to approve of no-fault divorce, polygamy, or the
consumption of alcohol.”) (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599 (2003) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)).
174 See Anderson Cooper 360°, supra note 145 and accompanying text. R
175 See id.
176 I thank Bennett Capers for offering this metaphor for the State’s role in granting
moral dignity, much as the Wizard of Oz distributes essential qualities from his seat on
high. See THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939).
177 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
178 Id.
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is a decisive development and sudden reversal: the sword of the State has
turned into a wand. Homosexuals are now blessed with dignity.179
Windsor marks the fourth and current phase in the transition of the legal
homosexual. In 1986, Bowers affirmed the moral condemnation of homosex-
ual sodomy by states.180 In 1996, Romer declared moral neutrality, conclud-
ing that homosexuals constitute a class that deserves equal protection under
the law.181 In 2003, Lawrence went beyond moral neutrality to protect and
validate the private intimate decisions of homosexuals.182 Finally, in 2013,
Windsor declared that State recognition of same-sex marriages enhanced the
dignity and integrity of same-sex couples.183 Figure 1 summarizes these four
phases.
FIGURE 1
A METAMORPHOSIS OF THE LEGAL HOMOSEXUAL
Nature of the PrimaryMoral Role of theLegal ConstitutionalAssessment StateHomosexual Right/Principle
The Immoral
No Right toSodomite Phase Legitimate
A Sexual Immoral Sexual Engage in
Morals
Sodomite Conduct HomosexualBowers v. Legislation
SodomyHardwick (1986)
The Equal
Homosexual
No Animus-Class Phase A Member of a Equal Protection
Moral Neutrality Based
Protected Class (14th Amendment)
LegislationRomer v. Evans
(1996)
The Free Intimate
Bond Phase
An Enduring Moral End of Morals Liberty
Intimate Bond Recognition Legislation? (14th Amendment)Lawrence v. Texas
(2003)
The Dignified
Married Couple
“Positive” Federalism &Phase A Married
Moral Praise Morals “Equal Dignity”
Couple
Legislation (5th Amendment)United States v.
Windsor (2013)
179 See infra, Part III.B. See also Jeffrey A. Redding, Querying Edith Windsor, Que-
rying Equality, 59 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 9, 12–13 (2013), http://lawweb2009.law.
villanova.edu/lawreview/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Redding_FINAL-2.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/DZJ-44A2.
180 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
181 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
182 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
183 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013).
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II. THE CONDITIONS OF MORAL TRANSFORMATION
In Thinking Sex, Gayle Rubin explored the idea that legal and social
understandings of “good sex” and “bad sex” shift over time.184 As Rubin
explained, “[m]ost systems of sexual judgment—religious, psychological,
feminist, or socialist—attempt to determine on which side of the line a par-
ticular act falls.”185 Acts that are considered good—but only those—“are
accorded moral complexity.”186 But “sex acts on the bad side of the line are
considered utterly repulsive and devoid of all emotional nuance.”187 Over the
course of time, some acts or identities may shift over from the “bad sex” to
the “good sex” side of the line.188 For instance, “if [homosexuality] is cou-
pled and monogamous,” Rubin wrote in her 1984 essay, “society is begin-
ning to recognize that it includes the full range of human interaction.”189
Rubin’s theory beautifully captured what would happen to the legal ho-
mosexual in the decades to follow. As we saw above, in Bowers the legal
homosexual was perceived by the Court as an immoral sexual sodomite, but
by the time Windsor was decided, the legal homosexual had become a mor-
ally praiseworthy citizen. What did the legal homosexual have to acquire or
abandon in order to be accorded moral nuance and complexity? This Part
outlines three conditions that proved critical for placing homosexuality on
the path to moral praise: (1) desexualization, (2) privatization, and (3) coup-
ling and reproduction. I will discuss each in turn.
A. Bodies: Desexualization
The moral ascent of the legal homosexual over the last three decades
has depended on the declining visibility of erotic acts. This reverse relation
of sex to morality reflects what has been called “sex negativity,” an attitude
that treats human sexuality with suspicion, and “[v]irtually all erotic behav-
ior [as] bad unless a specific reason to exempt it has been established.”190
184 GAYLE S. RUBIN, Thinking Sex, in DEVIATIONS: A GAYLE RUBIN READER 137,
151–54 (2011).
185 Id. at 151.
186 Id. (“For instance, heterosexual encounters may be sublime or disgusting, free or
forced, healing or destructive, romantic or mercenary. As long as it does not violate other
rules, heterosexuality is acknowledged to exhibit the full range of human experience.”).
187 Id.
188 Id. (“As a result of the sex conflicts of the last decade, some behavior near the
border is inching across it. Unmarried couples living together, masturbation, and some
forms of homosexuality are moving in the direction of respectability . . . .”).
189 Id. at 154.
190 Id. at 148. (“This culture always treats sex with suspicion. . . . Sex is presumed
guilty until proven innocent. Virtually all erotic behavior is considered bad unless a spe-
cific reason to exempt it has been established. The most acceptable excuses are marriage,
reproduction, and love. Sometimes scientific curiosity, aesthetic experience, or a long-
term intimate relationship may serve. But the exercise of erotic capacity, intelligence,
curiosity, or creativity all require pretexts that are unnecessary for other pleasures, such
as the enjoyment of food, fiction, or astronomy.”).
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Following this theme along the cases that make up the moral metamorphosis
traced here—Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor—enables us to see clearly how
the legal homosexual has undergone a process of desexualization.191
It began in Romer. With the emergence of the homosexual class, sex
acts were no longer discussed. The legal homosexual in Romer had nothing
to do with the crimes of sodomy described in Bowers. The homosexual be-
came “a class we shall refer to as homosexual persons or gays and lesbi-
ans.”192 As Janet Halley has put it, “Romer, after all, is the decision in which
a majority of the Supreme Court proposes to take the sex out of homosexu-
als.”193 One of the effects of Romer’s failure to mention Bowers, according
to Halley, is that “Romer reconfigures its audience: it asks not for the differ-
entiated, viscerally implicated, embodied, and identified audience of Hard-
wick but for a homogenous, reasoning, intending audience.”194 Bowers
involved real bodies committing real sex acts,195 whereas Romer created an
amorphous, bodiless, class of citizens.196 Turning the homosexual into an
amorphous member of a class of citizens proved to be a successful strategy
in Romer.
Next was Lawrence, perhaps the most dramatic desexualizing decision
to date. Here, the “homosexual sodomite” was recast as an “intimate
bond.”197 Recall that the Bowers Court conceptualized sodomy as an individ-
ual criminal act. By contrast, Lawrence’s rhetoric involved two people en-
gaging in sexual intimacy. Lawrence, in contrast with Romer, was actually a
case about sex,198 and Tyron Garner and John Lawrence were far from an
“enduring intimate bond.”199 They were not a couple or even lovers.200 They
were only acquaintances, whom police officers claimed to have observed
191 For an earlier articulation of this theme, see Mary Anne Case, Commentary,
Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on the Legal History of Litigat-
ing For Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 1643, 1659–60 (1993) [hereinafter
Case, Couples and Coupling] (“[I]t is most interesting that two of the most prominent
victories in gay rights litigation, Braschi and Kowalski are cases in which the court can
bless a couple without blessing their sexual activities. In neither case is the couple func-
tioning as a couple—Braschi’s lover is dead, Kowalski has emerged from a coma severely
impaired—so the court can focus on all the wonderful pair bonding without being
threatened by the sexual implications of that pair bonding.”) (footnotes and citations
omitted).
192 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624.
193 Halley, Romer v. Hardwick, supra note 23, at 433. R
194 Id. at 435.
195 Id. (“Readers of Hardwick cannot, I think, negotiate the text without making some
reference, however fleeting, to these bodies, investments, and identifications.”).
196 See, e.g. Romer, 517 U.S. at 624; cf. Boucai, supra note 140, at 452–53 (describ- R
ing the invisibility of bisexuality in same-sex marriage litigation); Yoshino, supra note
140, at 395–96 (noting the erasure of bisexuals and their sexuality in Romer); supra notes R
140–144 (examining the erasure of bisexuality from Romer in relation to Windsor). R
197 See supra Part I.C.
198 But see CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT, supra note 85, at 67–74 (arguing that it R
is unlikely that John Lawrence and Tyron Garner, the two defendants in Lawrence, were
actually having sex when the police entered Lawrence’s home).
199 See id. at 61–63.
200 See id.
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having illicit sex in Lawrence’s bedroom.201 But instead of discussing sex,
the Court famously took sodomy out of the picture, asserting that the Bowers
majority had mischaracterized the issue before it.202 Lawrence reasoned that
the problem with sodomy laws was that they “seek to control a personal
relationship that . . . is within the liberty of persons to choose without being
punished as criminals.”203 The issue was the liberty to engage in private inti-
mate conduct.204 Homosexual sex was now recast by the Court as intimate
private acts.
Finally, in Windsor, we find the legal homosexual, this time two mar-
ried women, stripped of their sexuality and sex acts altogether. In the docu-
mentary film, Edie & Thea: A Very Long Engagement, Edith Windsor and
Thea Spyer discuss their long and exceedingly erotic love story.205 It is crys-
tal clear, throughout this documentary, and in further interviews, that it was
important for Edith and Thea to convey that sex was a meaningful part of
their relationship.206 As Edith Windsor tells fans, “Keep it hot!” was one of
the couple’s secrets to a long relationship.207 The Supreme Court’s version of
their lives would not lead the reader to suspect any such thing. The Court’s
decision centers on the couple’s 2007 marriage ceremony and lifelong com-
mitment to each other.208 The only longing captured by the Court’s decision
is the couple’s “long[ing] to marry.”209
Whereas sex is utterly absent in Windsor, the Court mentioned the
couple’s concerns about Thea’s health, which led them to marry in Canada in
2007.210 In fact, Thea’s disability may have been one of the aspects that made
Windsor an appealing plaintiff to challenge DOMA,211 since her disability
201 Id. at 67–70.
202 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (“[The Court’s] statement [that
Bowers concerned whether homosexuals had a right to engage in sodomy], we now con-
clude, discloses the Court’s own failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake. To
say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct
demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple
were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse.”).
203 Id. (emphasis added).
204 See Teemu Ruskola, Gay Rights Versus Queer Theory: What’s Left of Sodomy
After Lawrence v. Texas?, 23 SOCIAL TEXT 235, 236–37 (2005) (discussing the shift from
a right to engage in sodomy to a liberty to engage in private intimate conduct, and argu-
ing that Bowers got the constitutional question right, even though it answered it wrong).
205 See EDIE & THEA: A VERY LONG ENGAGEMENT (Bless Bless Productions 2009)
[hereinafter A VERY LONG ENGAGEMENT] .
206 See id. After the decision was published, Windsor told a reporter, “If I didn’t have
nice breasts, Thea and I never would have gotten together.” Ariel Levy, The Perfect Wife,
NEW YORKER, Sept. 30, 2013, at 56.
207 Id. at 54.
208 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013) (“Edith Windsor and
Thea Spyer met in New York City in 1963 and began a long-term relationship. Windsor
and Spyer registered as domestic partners when New York City gave that right to same-
sex couples in 1993.”).
209 Id. at 2689.
210 Id. at 2683.
211 See Levy, supra note 206, at 62. R
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could help to desexualize her.212 Desexualizing Edith and Thea was appar-
ently a litigation strategy. Shortly after the Court’s decision in Windsor,
Edith Windsor’s attorney recalled that when she initially took her client’s
case pro bono, she made rules for her client: she instructed her not to talk
publicly about sex.213 As Windsor’s attorney explained in a New Yorker arti-
cle with the telling title, The Perfect Wife, “All I needed was Antonin Scalia
reading about Edie and Thea’s butch-femme escapades.”214
B. Space: Privatization
The second condition on the path to moral praise involved a growing
emphasis on the private legal homosexual. The legal homosexual is per-
ceived as someone who has private (as opposed to public) sex, and lives a
private, domesticated life. This perception crystallized in Lawrence. The
Lawrence Court could have declared a liberty to engage in an unfettered
sexual life. But it did not. It articulated a liberty to engage in private, consen-
sual, homosexual intimacy.215 As Justice Kennedy reasoned:
It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter
upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own
private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. When
sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another
person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that
is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows
homosexual persons the right to make this choice.216
The key words here are “their homes,” “private lives,” “intimate conduct,”
and “personal bond that is more enduring.”217 The Lawrence majority
decriminalized homosexual sodomy, and at the same time confined it geo-
graphically to non-public spaces. This private notion of liberty, which Kath-
erine Franke has called a “curious form of liberty,” is “less expansive,
rather geographized, and, in the end, domesticated.”218
212 See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in the
Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1317 (2009) (“[W]hile law and
norms play matchmaker when it comes to sex and race, the norm surrounding disability
has typically been one of utter isolation, or desexualization . . . .”).
213 Levy, supra note 206, at 54. R
214 Id.
215 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The petitioners are entitled to
respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their
destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the
Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without interven-
tion of the government.”).
216 Id. at 567 (emphasis added).
217 Id.
218 Katherine Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 1399, 1401 (2004). See also id. at 1400 (“[I]n Lawrence the Court relies on a
narrow version of liberty that is both geographized and domesticated—not a robust con-
ception of sexual freedom or liberty, as is commonly assumed. In this way, Lawrence
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The spotlight on the private legal homosexual has also been prevalent
in contemporary same-sex marriage litigation.219 Interestingly, in Glorious
Precedents: When Same-Sex Marriage Was Radical, Michael Boucai argues
that the gay marriage challenges of the 1970s stand in sharp contrast to our
current moment.220 According to Boucai, these early plaintiffs did not advo-
cate private sex, monogamy, or even long enduring commitments.221 Their
goal was not assimilation to bourgeois domesticity.222 It was liberation. They
wanted to pose a political challenge to a discriminatory institution.223 These
“glorious” precedents, all of which failed miserably in courts,224 teach us
that marriage equality litigation was not always pursued through the frame-
work of private sex and domestic lives. Even more to the point, for the meta-
morphosis traced here, it is vital to see how privatization played a role in
making the legal homosexual more intelligible—and at the end more
moral—in the eyes of the Court.
C. Relationships: Coupling and Reproduction
In 1993, still in the shadow of Bowers, Mary Anne Case aptly observed
that “the couple, the missing third term between the individual and the com-
munity, is an extremely suggestive absence from the [lesbian and gay] liti-
gation history.”225 Case pointed out that the privacy right in Griswold v.
Connecticut226 was originally granted to the married couple who had sought
to use contraceptives—not to individuals.227 Accordingly, Case suggested
both echoes and reinforces a pull toward domesticity in current gay and lesbian
organizing.”).
219 See, e.g., Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1199–1200 (D. Utah 2013)
(“The right to marry is intertwined with the rights to privacy and intimate association,
and an individual’s choices related to marriage are protected because they are integral to a
person’s dignity and autonomy.”); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 885 (N.M. 2013)
(“The United States Supreme Court also has described the right to marry as ‘of funda-
mental importance for all individuals’ and as ‘part of the fundamental “right of privacy”
implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.’” (quoting Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978)).)
220 Michael Boucai, Glorious Precedents: When Same-Sex Marriage Was Radical, 27
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. (forthcoming 2015) (on file with author).
221 Id.
222 See id.
223 See id.
224 See Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d
185 (Minn. 1971), appeal denied, Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); Singer v. Hara,
522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App.), appeal denied, Singer v. Hara, 84 Wash.2d 1008 (1974).
225 See Case, Couples and Coupling, supra note 191, at 1648, 1651 (“[B]y ‘couple,’ I R
mean two gay men or lesbians together in any intimate capacity, whether it be for a
lifetime of domestic partnership or a ‘quickie.’”).
226 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
227 Case, Couples and Coupling, supra note 191, at 1654 (“The right of privacy ar- R
ticulated by the majority in Griswold was, after all, first and foremost a relational right,
not one centered in the autonomy of the individual. For the Griswold majority, that ‘case
. . . concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy . . . And it concerns a law
which . . . ha[s] a maximum destructive impact upon that relationship.”) (alterations in
original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485).
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that to establish a gay and lesbian “intimate association” right, “it may be
necessary to go back to Griswold, i.e., to a strong pair bond.”228 This is
because courts “have seen their enterprise with respect to heterosexuals in
earlier cases as promoting pair bonding, not mere copulation.”229
The legal homosexual, suggested Case, had been losing some cases due
to an absent pair bond.230 In the sodomy cases, in particular, Case under-
scored that the plaintiffs often challenged sodomy statutes as individuals, not
as couples.231 For example, Hardwick challenged the Georgia statute by him-
self and not with his fellow sex-mate, and “this absence of a pair bond to go
along with the copulating is what makes Hardwick, otherwise so ideal, an
imperfect vehicle.”232 Case concluded that in some contexts, especially sod-
omy challenges, which are already sexualized, “a greater focus on pair-
bonding clearly has benefits that outweigh the risks.”233 Mary Anne Case’s
analysis indeed predicted the two later couples-oriented decisions in our
metamorphosis: Lawrence and Windsor. As we saw above, these two cases
were entirely oriented toward the couple. Gays (Lawrence) and lesbians
(Windsor) now appear in the Court’s rhetoric as couples or intimate bonds.
This, as Case suggested over twenty years ago, has proved a winning strat-
egy in both the sodomy and marriage contexts.
In addition to the same-sex couple already emergent in Lawrence,
Windsor added children to the mix. Despite the fact that Edith and Thea
never had children,234 the children of same-sex couples are a key presence
throughout the Windsor decision. The decision discusses, for instance, the
humiliating effects of the Defense of Marriage Act on children,235 the impor-
tance of committing in marriage before children,236 and the difficulty “for
the children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own fam-
228 Id.
229 Id. at 1655.
230 Case acknowledges though that coupling can serve as a double-edged sword,
sometimes leading to defeat. Id. at 1666 (“Whether a gay litigant is seen as part of a
couple may spell the difference between victory and defeat for him or her. Unfortunately,
sometimes being coupled seems to spell victory, at other times defeat.”).
231 Id. at 1647–48.
232 Id. at 1653 (footnote omitted) (explaining that “[t]here are understandable rea-
sons for the absence of Hardwick’s partner from the litigation—he was a schoolteacher
from North Carolina, a married man, and a one-night stand. ‘Please don’t tell my wife . . .
I’ll lose my teaching job,’ he begged the officer who arrested them. It was not surprising
that he ‘pleaded to lesser charges and split,’ leaving Hardwick alone to fight the case.”
(alteration in original)).
233 Id. at 1694.
234 Levy, supra note 206, at 57; see also Redding, supra note 179, at 15 (characteriz- R
ing Windsor as “queer” for not having children).
235 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (DOMA “humiliates tens
of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples.”).
236 Id. at 2689 (“Slowly at first and then in rapid course, the laws of New York came
to acknowledge the urgency of this issue for same-sex couples who wanted to affirm their
commitment to one another before their children, their family, their friends, and their
community.”).
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ily.”237 So in Windsor, in addition to the couple, the Court casts children and
reproduction as characteristic of the legal homosexual.238
In sum, we see that three conditions are at the core of the transition of
the legal homosexual from an immoral sodomite to a dignified married
couple. The legal homosexual is commonly perceived as desexualized,
privatized, and coupled and reproductive.
III. INCOMPLETE CLOSURE: WINDSOR’S WEAK DIGNITY
The history of DOMA’s enactment and its own text demon-
strate that interference with the equal dignity of same-sex mar-
riages, a dignity conferred by the States in the exercise of their
sovereign power, was more than an incidental effect of the federal
statute. It was its essence.
— Justice Kennedy, United States v. Windsor239
The concept of human dignity is not new in the jurisprudence of the
Court. It has been especially prominent in decisions authored by Justice
Kennedy.240 As Reva Siegel has observed, the normative meaning of human
dignity varies from case to case, such that “[a]t different points . . . dignity
concerns the value of life, the value of liberty, and the value of equality.”241
In fact, dignity can sometimes support opposing normative positions. For
instance, in Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court appealed to human dignity to
justify government restriction of abortions,242 whereas in Casey, the Court
appealed to human dignity to support a woman’s right to terminate her
pregnancy.243
What work does dignity do in Windsor? The discussion of Windsor in
Part I examined the doctrinal significance of dignity in the Court’s hold-
ing.244 This Part argues that Windsor’s dignity is weak for three principal
237 Id. at 2694.
238 Since the 2000s, children of gay and lesbian couples have also appeared in popu-
lar culture. See, e.g., THE KIDS ARE ALL RIGHT (Focus Features 2010); The L Word
(Showtime 2004–2009); The New Normal (NBC 2012–2013).
239 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
240 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003); Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
241 Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions
Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1701–02 (2008); see also id. at 1696 (“[I]n
substantive due process and equal protection cases constitutional protections for dignity
vindicate, often concurrently, the value of life, the value of liberty, and the value of
equality.”); see generally Mary Anne Case, Of “This” and “That” in Lawrence v. Texas,
2003 SUP. CT. REV. 75 (2003) (discussing the role of dignity in Lawrence).
242 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007).
243 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851; see also Siegel, supra note 241, at 1696 (“[A] commit- R
ment to dignity structures the undue burden test itself, which allows government to regu-
late abortion to demonstrate respect for the dignity of human life so long as such
regulation also demonstrates respect for the dignity of women.”) (footnote omitted).
244 Supra Part I.D.1.
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reasons. First, it is conferred by the State and at each state’s discretion. Sec-
ond, Windsor’s dignity is much narrower in scope than contemporary theo-
ries of dignity promoted by legal and moral philosophers. Third, Windsor’s
State-conferred dignity comes with unnecessary rhetoric of injured subjects,
a rhetoric that could perpetuate an attachment to injury by homosexual
couples and other rights-seeking legal subjects.
A. Weak Source: State-Conferred Dignity
The Windsor decision repeatedly affirms that the State is the source of
human dignity. Upon arrival of what the Court calls “a new perspective, a
new insight,”245 some states have decided to dignify same-sex couples by
recognizing their marriages. This “conferred upon them a dignity and status
of immense import”246 and “enhanced the recognition, dignity, and protec-
tion of the class.”247 This novel theory of State-conferred dignity is problem-
atic for at least two reasons.
First, and more importantly, in contrast with God or his derivative insti-
tutions, the source of the State’s authority to grant moral dignity is unclear.
The State can grant liberal rights such as liberty and equality, but those, at
least in their common use, are understood as secular liberal rights. They do
not confer moral value on individuals. Windsor seems to locate the power to
confer dignity in the formation of consensus within communities.248 Namely,
the State confers dignity after the local community has decided to accept a
group of previously disapproved-of individuals. But if dignity is a serious
human value, it should be guaranteed by the State, like equality and liberty,
to all members of society. It should not have to wait for the moral approval
of a majority of the population.
Second, it is unclear whether State-conferred dignity can travel across
state lines. Under the Court’s rendering, a state decision to recognize same-
sex marriages enhances the dignity of that class only “in their own commu-
nity.”249 So if Amy and Emily marry in Iowa, a state that recognizes their
marriage, they will be dignified in Iowa. But when they travel to the neigh-
boring Nebraska, or to Georgia or Alabama, that dignity may have to stay
behind, and their marriage may once again be undignified.250 It is strange
indeed to imagine losing one’s dignity when crossing state lines.
245 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013).
246 Id. at 2692.
247 Id.
248 Id. at 2692–93 (discussing “the formation of consensus respecting the way the
members of a discrete community treat each other in their daily contact and constant
interaction with each other” and “the community’s considered perspective on the histori-
cal roots of the institution of marriage and its evolving understanding of the meaning of
equality”).
249 Id. at 2692.
250 See Baude, supra note 116, at 157 (arguing that “even if courts conclude that R
some form of interstate recognition is constitutionally required, not all recognitions are
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\37-2\HLG202.txt unknown Seq: 36 29-MAY-14 11:30
278 Harvard Journal of Law & Gender [Vol. 37
B. Weak Scope: A Narrow Theory of Human Dignity
Windsor’s theory of State-conferred dignity is significantly narrower
than other present and historical conceptions of human dignity. Human dig-
nity has played an important role in international and national human rights
movements,251 and it has provided a basis for much theorizing about social
justice.252 To illuminate just how narrow Windsor’s theory of State-conferred
dignity is, let us briefly consider how moral philosophers have treated the
concept of human dignity.
Dignity has received growing attention in contemporary moral philoso-
phy and legal theory. For example, Martha Nussbaum’s approach to justice is
based on human dignity. Nussbaum has argued that respect for human dig-
nity requires that governments should support central human “capabili-
ties.”253 Nussbaum defines dignity as follows:
If something has dignity, as Kant put it well, it does not merely
have a price: it is not merely something to be used for the ends of
others, or traded on the market. This idea is closely linked to the
idea of respect as the proper attitude toward dignity; indeed, rather
than thinking of the two concepts as totally independent, so that
we would first offer an independent account of dignity and then
argue that dignity deserves respect (as independently defined), I
the same. One important distinction is between already-married couples who move to a
new state that does not recognize their marriage (a “migratory” marriage) and couples
who live in a state that does not allow them to marry, but get married on a brief trip
outside of that state (an “evasive” marriage).”).
251 See, e.g., GRUNDGESETZ FU¨R DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGE-
SETZ][GG][BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. 1, art. 1, § 1 (Ger.) (“Human dignity
shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.”);
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752–1992, SH No. 1391, § 2 (Isr.) (“There
shall be no violation of the life, body or dignity of any person as such.”); Fourth Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 3(1)(c),
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (prohibiting “outrages upon personal
dignity”); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, pmbl., U.N.
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“recognition of the inherent dignity and of the
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of
freedom, justice and peace in the world”).
252 For a history of the idea of dignity, see generally Martha Nussbaum, Human Dig-
nity and Political Entitlements, in HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS: ESSAYS COMMIS-
SIONED BY THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS 351 (2008) [hereinafter Nussbaum,
Human Dignity], available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/human_dig-
nity/chapter14.html, archived at http://perma.cc/5QTH-PWLA; see also id. at 352 (“Ac-
cording to the Greek and Roman Stoics, the basis for human community is the worth of
reason in each and every human being. Reason (meaning practical reason, the capacity
for moral choice), is, in the Stoic view, a portion of the divine in each of us.”) (footnote
omitted).
253 See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONAL-
ITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 70–71 (2006); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 5 (2000). The core capabilities that, accord-
ing to Nussbaum, should be supported by all democracies are as follows: life, bodily
health, bodily integrity, senses, imagination and thought, emotions, practical reason, affil-
iation, other species, play, and control over one’s environment. Id. at 78–80.
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believe that we should think of the two notions as closely related,
forming a concept-family to be jointly elucidated.254
Dignity is ultimately bound up with respect, according to Nussbaum, and it
is the responsibility of the liberal state to ensure this respect. The state does
not grant dignity. Its only function is to safeguard it.255
Jeremy Waldron has argued for a slightly different understanding of
human dignity, connected to what he calls “responsibility-rights.”256 Wal-
dron’s concept of dignity draws upon the importance of social rank, but with
a twist.257 As he explains, “the idea of general human dignity associated
itself [with] the notion that humans as such were a high-ranking species,
called to a special vocation in the world, and that in a sense each of us was
to be regarded as endued with a certain nobility or royalty, each of us was to
be regarded as a creature of a high rank.”258 Waldron conceives current lib-
eral societies as societies not without caste, but rather, “with just one caste
and a very high caste at that: every man a Brahmin. Every man a duke, every
woman a queen, everyone entitled to the sort of deference and consideration,
everyone’s person and body sacrosanct . . . .”259 Given this elevated status of
all individuals, a societal commitment to dignity must connect individual
rights with social responsibilities toward others.260
254 Nussbaum, Human Dignity, supra note 252, at 353–54. R
255 Id. at 359–60 (“Respect for human dignity is not just lip service, it means creating
conditions favorable for development and choice. . . . [I]t is the task of the ‘basic struc-
ture’ of society to put in place the necessary conditions for a minimally decent human
life, a life at least minimally worthy of human dignity, expressive of at least minimal
respect. If we accept such an account . . . this yields the conclusion that government
(meaning the basic structure of society) should support the central human capabilities.”).
256 Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107,
1116 (2011). The Second Amendment right to bear arms is one example of a responsibil-
ity-right. Id. at 1117 (“[T]he way the Second Amendment is drafted presents it as a
responsibility right, which admittedly does not obliterate the restraint on government—
indeed the citizen militia is supposed to be a potentially anti-government force—but also
does not leave it as a simply libertarian entitlement. The responsibility aspect is a way of
informing and conditioning the individual possession and exercise of the right.”); see
also Noa Ben-Asher, Obligatory Health, 15 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 18 (2012)
(characterizing the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act as a praiseworthy obli-
gation of citizens towards the basic health needs of other fellow-citizens).
257 Id. at 1118 (“In Roman usage, dignitas embodied the idea of the honor, the privi-
leges and the deference due to rank or office, perhaps also reflecting one’s distinction in
holding that rank or office. And the Oxford English Dictionary still gives as its second
meaning for the term ‘Honourable or high estate, position, or estimation; . . . degree of
estimation, rank’ and as its third meaning ‘An honourable office, rank, or title; a high
official or titular position.’”) (footnote omitted).
258 Id. at 1119. But cf. Franke, Dignifying Rights, supra note 169, at 1178 (arguing R
that linking rights, responsibility, and dignity may at times require some to “behav[e]
responsibly,” turning dignity into “an accomplishment, a normative practice which re-
quires work. It is something you can, indeed must, earn and can risk losing.”).
259 Waldron, Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, supra note 256, at 1120 (footnote R
omitted).
260 Id. at 1136 (“And it is a way of connecting rights with socially important func-
tions, not just seeing them as an individualist limit on the ambit of social functions. It is
also, as I have said, an important way of connecting rights with dignity. For these rea-
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Both of these approaches, despite differences between them, concep-
tualize human dignity as something that all individuals possess and that soci-
ety must protect, defend, and enhance. Under Nussbaum’s approach, all
humans have dignity and this translates into a set of obligations for modern
states.261 Under Waldron’s approach, human dignity comes from dignitas,
which is a rank that all citizens share in liberal democracies.262 One need not
accept either theory of dignity to agree that, if dignity is to be embraced as a
social or legal value, it should not be understood to come from the State.
Neither theory of dignity derives human dignity from State recognition. Wal-
dron and Nussbaum’s views usefully illustrate how far afield the Court’s
presentation of dignity is from contemporary philosophical accounts.
C. Weak Subjects: Windsor’s Injured Subjects
The word that Kennedy used a lot was dignity . . . and when you
are a kid and you figure out you’re gay when you’re seven years
old . . . you don’t know about sex or anything like that, but you do
know that you’ll never be able to have a life like your mom and
dad. Be married. And that’s a huge wound to some kids’ self-es-
teem, identity, psychological pride, and that wound has been
healed a little today. And I think of all the future people who will
be less damaged and less wounded, will feel less pain . . . .”
— Andrew Sullivan, CNN interview with Anderson Cooper263
United States v. Windsor tells the story of wounded and injured sub-
jects.264 The Defense of Marriage Act, according to Windsor, “demeans the
couple, . . . whose relationship the State has sought to dignify.”265 It “im-
poses a disability on the class”;266 it “places same-sex couples in an unstable
sons, then, I think the responsibility form of rights is a useful and important resource to
add to our analytic repertoire.”); see also Jeremy Waldron, Citizenship and Dignity 10
(N.Y.U. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper
No. 12-74, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=2196079, archived at http://perma.cc/P464-6JBK (“[C]itizenship comprises a bundle
of rights, powers, duties, and liabilities, determined in its content and application as a
matter of law rather than as a matter of choice and united by an underlying social concern
focused on individuals of certain types or in certain predicaments.”).
261 See Nussbaum, Human Dignity, supra note 252, at 359–60. R
262 See Waldron, Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, supra note 256, at 1118–20. R
263 Anderson Cooper 360°, supra note 145. R
264 See 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013) (“[T]his Court [has] to address whether the
resulting injury and indignity is a deprivation of an essential part of the liberty protected
by the Fifth Amendment.”); see also Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?, supra note 148, at R
685 (“[I]f two people want to make a commitment of the marital sort, they should be
permitted to do so, and excluding one class of citizens from the benefits and dignity of
that commitment demeans them and insults their dignity.”).
265 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
266 Id. at 2695–96; see also id. at 2696 (“The federal statute is invalid, for no legiti-
mate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom
the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”).
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position of being in a second-tier marriage.”267 Furthermore, the injury,
Windsor tells us, extends to the children of same-sex couples. DOMA “hu-
miliates tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex
couples.”268 DOMA, thus understood, was powerful legislation that caused
immense wounds. These wounds, according to Windsor, did not occur as a
result of recklessness or even negligence by Congress. The injuries were
caused by an intentional act of animus,269 a statute that was meant to “de-
mean” same-sex couples.270 The majority in Windsor claimed that DOMA
was designed for that purpose alone: to disadvantage and stigmatize married
same-sex couples.271
This language of injury resonates with the argument, articulated most
fully by Wendy Brown, that contemporary identity politics runs the risk of
reinforcing “wounded attachments.”272 Brown explains,
In locating a site of blame for its powerlessness over its past—a
past of injury, a past as a hurt will—and locating a “reason” for
the “unendurable pain” of social powerlessness in the present, it
converts this reasoning into an ethicizing politics . . . . Politicized
identity thus enunciates itself, makes claims for itself, only by en-
trenching, restating, dramatizing, and inscribing its pain in politics
. . . .273
267 Id. at 2694.
268 Id. (“[DOMA] makes it even more difficult for the children to understand the
integrity and closeness of their own family . . . .”).
269 But see id. at 2708 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“But the majority says that the support-
ers of this Act acted with malice. . . . I am sure these accusations are quite untrue.”).
270 Id. at 2695 (“The principal purpose and the necessary effect of this law are to
demean those persons who are in a lawful same-sex marriage.”).
271 Id. at 2693 (“The avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here in question
are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into
same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.”). The
Court seems to have drawn much of the rhetoric of injury and stigma from the “the
voices of [the] children” amici brief, which was submitted to the Supreme Court by
multiple groups, including the Family Equality Council and the Child Rights Project at
Emory University School of Law. See Brief for Family Equality Council et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307) and Hol-
lingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144). One of the brief’s main claims
was that DOMA and Proposition 8 stigmatized and delegitimized same-sex parented fam-
ilies. Id. at 23–31. The brief asserts that children of same-sex parents are “very much
demeaned and stigmatized by being ‘treated differently,’” and that “these feelings of
stigmatization, inferiority, and de-legitimization are common themes heard by the amici
who work every day with children raised by same-sex parents.” Id. at 25.  The brief also
asserts that this stigmatization “can lead children to have insecurity about their parents’
relationship.” Id.
272 See WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY 52–55 (1995).
273 Id. at 74 (1995). Brown criticizes identity politics as a psychological reflection of
Nietzschian ressentiment. Brown sees in the contemporary mobilization of rights claims a
troubling directing or channeling of individual feelings of ressentiment toward the other,
the perceived injurer.
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The problem, according to Brown, arises when a past injury becomes an
important constituent of individual and group identity.274 When this happens,
the individual and group identity may become attached to—dependent and
responsive to—its past wounds.275 The identity group becomes unable to ar-
ticulate new values, new ideas, new morality, and new alternatives.276 Wind-
sor’s rhetoric of injury risks creating the type of “wounded attachment” that
Brown warned about. Windsor posits an entire class of people as demeaned,
injured, and humiliated by one piece of legislation that defined marriage as a
union between one man and one woman.
Windsor is thus a paradoxical legal moment. At the same time that it
cures an injustice, it plants the seed for future feelings of resentment. By
invalidating DOMA, the Court has reversed a gross injustice, a law that pro-
moted marriage inequality for seventeen years. But the Court’s vigorous
rhetoric of indignity, injury, and humiliation also encourages conceptions of
injury and shame in present and future LGBT identity politics. Windsor
sends a message to those who live in states that do not recognize marriage
equality that they should feel harmed and humiliated.
Advocates should resist this infectious rhetoric of injury in future advo-
cacy and politics by insisting that those who enacted DOMA are the ones
who have been humiliated by it. The Court could have avoided this damag-
ing discourse by invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act on straightfor-
ward Equal Protection grounds. The Court could have ruled, as it did in
Romer, and as the Iowa Supreme Court did in Varnum v. Brien,277 that treat-
ing classes of people differently for no legitimate purpose violates the Equal
Protection guarantees of the Constitution. But it did not.278 Instead, Windsor,
hailed as one of the biggest civil rights victories of our times,279 introduced
the prospect of new shame and indignity for those who still cannot marry.
274 See id. at 68–70.
275 See id. at 70–74.
276 See id. at 52–76; cf. generally Jeannie Suk, The Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies and
Minds of Abortion Discourse, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1193 (2010) (showing how trauma
narratives adopted by feminists in the 1970s in relation to rape have re-emerged in recent
abortion cases).
277 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009) (“In this case, we must decide if our state
statute limiting civil marriage to a union between a man and a woman violates the Iowa
Constitution, as the district court ruled. On our review, we hold the Iowa marriage statute
violates the equal protection clause of the Iowa Constitution.”).
278 For a discussion of the likely reasons for the majority’s approach, see supra notes
116–134 and accompanying text. R
279 See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 134 (“If Bill Clinton was ‘the first Black president,’ R
Anthony Kennedy has now firmly secured his place in history as ‘the first gay Justice.’
. . . A hundred years from now, histories of the Court will treat Justice Kennedy w/r/t gay
rights the way we think of Earl Warren w/r/t racial equality.”); Goldberg, One-Two
Punch, supra note 117; Scott Lemieux, Two Cheers for the Supreme Court on LGBT R
Rights, AM. PROSPECT (June 26, 2013), http://prospect.org/article/two-cheers-supreme-
court-lgbt-rights, archived at http://perma.cc/K73S-QXGG (describing Windsor as “a
historic opinion and a major victory for civil rights”).
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Windsor’s dignity, in sum, suffers from three principal weaknesses:
(1) its source as something conferred by the State; (2) its narrow scope; and
(3) its rhetoric of wound and injury. Courts, litigators, social movements,
and scholars are now charged with rehabilitating Windsor’s dignity.
CONCLUSION
[I]t should be the questions and shape of a life, its total complex-
ity gathered, arranged and considered, which matters in the end,
not some stamp of salvation or damnation which disperses all the
complexity in some unsatisfying little decision—the balancing of
the scales.
—Angels in America, Part One: Millennium Approaches280
We have experienced a fascinating legal and moral metamorphosis in
the last three decades—from Bowers’ homosexual sodomite to Windsor’s
same-sex marriages “deemed by the State worthy of dignity.”281 This Article
has traced the road from there to here. In every decade since 1986, the Su-
preme Court portrayed the legal homosexual with a new and different em-
phasis. In Romer, the legal homosexual became a protected class;282 in
Lawrence, an enduring intimate bond;283 and in Windsor, a same-sex couple
dignified by marriage.284 Of course, this is not just a new sport of judicial
name-calling. In each of these transformative moments, a constitutional doc-
trine closely traced the new casting of the legal homosexual. In Romer (the
“Equal Homosexual Class Phase”), the homosexual class was granted equal
protection; in Lawrence (the “Free Intimate Bond Phase”), intimate, private
conduct was granted liberty from government intrusion; and in Windsor (the
“Dignified Married Couple Phase”), the married same-sex couple was un-
derstood to have been granted “equal dignity” by states who recognize
same-sex marriages.
Federal marriage equality is now here. As new marriage equality chal-
lenges make their way through the courts, advocates and courts will continue
to face the significant task of putting to work Windsor’s ruling on “equal
dignity.” Although Windsor will undoubtedly go down in history as a mile-
stone civil rights victory, its concept of human dignity sadly leaves much to
be desired. It is a weak dignity. Its source is the State and not the individual.
It is narrow in scope, and it comes with rhetoric of injury and humiliation.
What would a stronger dignity look like? It would invoke the concept
of human dignity while explicitly resisting the three primary weaknesses of
280 1 TONY KUSHNER, ANGELS IN AMERICA: A GAY FANTASIA ON NATIONAL THEMES,
PART ONE: MILLENNIUM APPROACHES 38–39 (1993).
281 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013).
282 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
283 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
284 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692.
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Windsor’s dignity. First, and most importantly, advocates and courts apply-
ing Windsor should clarify that “equal dignity” means that the State must
give equal recognition to the dignity of all individuals and couples. The
State grants marriage licenses, and it should grant them equally to all
couples. In so doing, the State does not distribute dignity; it acknowledges
dignity equally across citizens. Second, and relatedly, advocates should be
careful not to imply that human dignity is enhanced by marriage. If dignity
inheres in the individual,285 then neither the state where one resides nor the
state of matrimony increases that dignity. Finally, where possible, past injus-
tices, such as DOMA and sodomy laws, should be condemned without as-
suming that they have injured. A stronger account of dignity would resist
portraying all lesbians, gays, and bisexuals and their children as injured sub-
jects who have been humiliated and shamed by unjust laws. But even if
advocates may feel compelled to offer every argument that might persuade a
court, judges, in selecting among those arguments, have a choice about the
language and the light in which they cast the subjects who appear before
them.
In 1962, Edith Windsor asked a friend in New York City to take her to
“where the lesbians go.”286 There she met Thea, and they danced for the next
forty years. Edith and Thea lived a life of passion and joy. They were en-
gaged in 1967, before any state ever considered recognizing their union.
They protested after the 1969 Stonewall riots for justice for lesbians, homo-
sexuals, bisexuals, drag queens, and many others. The sign on their refriger-
ator said, “Don’t postpone joy.” In 2007, they married. Marriage did not
dignify Edith and Thea. They dignified marriage.
285 See supra Part III.B (discussing these arguments).
286 A VERY LONG ENGAGEMENT. Paradoxically, half a century later, in a decision that
bears Edith’s name, the lesbians will have in some significant way disappeared. See supra
Part II.A.
